Political capital in a transitional economy: a study of Chinese private entrepreneurs. by Tian, Xiaoli. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Sociology.
Political Capital in A Transitional Economy 
A Study of Chinese Private Entrepreneurs 
TIAN Xiaoli 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
in 
Sociology 
©The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
June 2003 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any person(s) intending to 
use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a proposed publication must seek copyright release 




Since the Chinese market reform, Chinese private entrepreneurs have formed 
their own characteristics different from other social classes. The purpose of this 
research is to test the significance of political patronage and clientelist networks in 
the development of private enterprises. Through analysis of existing survey data of 
1993，1995，1997 and 2000 and field interviews with officials and private 
entrepreneurs, I attempt to arrive at a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between the renascent private sector and the communal system. I am especially 
interested in investigating whether there is still clientelism between government 
officials and entrepreneurs, and, if so, what are the rational principles behind this 
clientelism and what are the motivations on both sides. 
My main findings are that the significance of party membership is declining and 
education is gaining importance, as market transition thesis would predict. Political 
connections (social capital) have increasing or persisting significance in the rural 
setting but not in the urban setting. I argue that these changes are due to a new kind 
of clientelism. In this context, entrepreneurs needn't pursue patron of government in 
the old informal way through opportunistic rent-seeking activities. There are new 


















Chapter 1 Introduction 
1. Introduction 
2. Social Background 
Social Structure Change After Mid-1990s 
Free Resources and Free Opportunities 
3. Research Question 
Chapter 2 History of Chinese Private Entrepreneurs 
1. First Period (1978-1992): Out of the System 
2. Second Period (1992-1997): Intertwine with the System 
2. Third Period (1997-now): New System in Form 
Chapter 3 Literature Review 
1. Market Transition Debate 





2. New Class Theory 
Dominating Cultural Capital 
Dominating Political Capital 
Dominating Teleological Knowledge 






Chapter 4 Principled Clientelism Preliminary Evidence from 
In-depth Interviews 
1. Local Government as Agent 
Incentives 
Resources and Services 
Who Are Chosen? 






3. Principled Clientelism 
4. From Symbiotic Clientelism to Principled Clientelism 
Transformation in Clientelism Spectrum 
Transformation in Clientelism Exchange 
Transformation in Clientelism Network 
Comparison of Different Clientelism 
5. Principled Clientelism Hypothesis 




4. Statistical Model 
Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis 
1. The Changing Profiles of Private Entrepreneurs 
Initial Occupation 
Trends of Political Credits 
2. Regression Analysis 
Results 
Test of Hypothesis 
6 
Chapter 7 Conclusion and Discussion 
Tables 
Appendix 1 List of Interviewees 
Appendix 2 About the Field Site 
Bibliography 
7 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years after the economic reform, China can boast of a large and growing 
private sector. Up to the end of 2001，there are 2,030,000 private enterprises and 
27,140,000 private entrepreneurs in China. The yearly increasing rate is about 
34%.'This is especially stunning if one recalls the extreme concentration of state 
socialist economy or the lack of formal institutional arrangement of property rights. 
As the result of reunification of socio-economic structure, interest structure and 
social relationship, and as new economic elites, Chinese private entrepreneurs have 
formed their own characteristics different from other social classes (Li 1995, 1998; 
Dai 2001; Song 1998). However, due to dispersion of property rights, it has not 
produced identifiable owners yet. It can very well be that the formation and 
emergence of private entrepreneurs is the most fascinating phenomena in Chinese 
social structure, attracting attention from both academic community and 
policy-makers (Li 1995). The revival of private business is regarded as one of the 
most consequential economic departures from orthodox central planning. The 
‘ D a t a resource: Chinese Business Time 
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economist Jdnos Komai concludes that "the rise of the private sector is the most 
important tendency in the economic sphere during the process of reform. It brings a 
deep change, since it affects the property relations and it does so in a radical way: 
private property appears alongside public property"(Kornai 1992:433). 
Many researches have been done about Chinese private entrepreneurs, but most 
of them are empirical descriptive researches, or exploring the process of 
development from the view of social network and social capital. As what the existing 
researches indicate, the Chinese private economy has never escape the influence of 
the old system. No matter the construction and use of social network (Lin 1995) or 
the relational convenience (Yang 2000)，all of them are the survival strategies of 
private entrepreneurs to face the existing system. The old system begins to shake, but 
the new rules have yet to be established. In order to survive, the private entrepreneurs 
ultimate their best to make the most of the resources they can control. Actors 
confronted with new challenges, and operating within old institutional constrains, 
come up with innovative answers (Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 1998). Observers of 
communist orders have pointed out that economic organizations and political power 
are defined by the party-state's bureaucratic control of resources (Djilas 1957). 
Central planning places allocation in the hands of the Communist Party officials. In 
this institutional arrangement, private entrepreneurs have to rely on relationship with 
officials controllers of resources to develop themselves. However, market 
has developed to some degree nowadays, and almost all the resources can be 
obtained in the market. Why private companies still try to cultivate their relationship 
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with government officials? Is their relationship really like some researches show: 
private entrepreneurs cultivate it forwardly and strategically? Does it become less 
important as formal structures become more routinized? Has the pattern or power 
characteristic between them changed? What do the changes tell us about the nature of 
political capital in Chinese society? These are the questions this research attempts to 
answer. 
In a post-socialist society as China, the valuable resources include not only 
economic capital and social capital，but also political capital. The distinctive feature 
of the construction of political capital lies in the fact that it is a self-conscious 
process from the very beginning, and is never the final destination. But its 
transformation with other kinds of capitals has no institutional arrangement or legal 
basis, thus providing a gray space for private entrepreneurs to choose their strategies. 
It is assumed in current literature about entrepreneurship that focal entrepreneur 
operates in a market-based economy where property rights are protected and has 
substantial discretion over the allocation of resources. Thus, the astonishing 
development of Chinese private economy in former centrally planned economies 
undergoing transition toward market-driven economies, where the entrepreneurial 
context is characterized by turbulence and change, has aroused the interest of both 
sociologist and economists. 
Theoretically, the Chinese transitional economy has aroused a lot of debates. The 
Market Transition debate for example, has been going on since 1980s and is still 
continuing. Institutional changes in the transformation of state socialism beg 
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theoretical explanations. But theorizing should be built on, not substitute for, the 
knowledge of the specific context and the processes in which these changes take 
place. Zhou Xueguang suggests directing our attention to seek answers in the actual 
processes of institutional changes, rather than confine our imagination within the 
terms of the current debate (Zhou 2000b). So, examining the operation of private 
business highlights the organization of the emerging market economy, and the 
institutional basis of its performance and political consequences (Wank 1999). This 
research reflects on the debates over political capital in the evolving market economy. 
It is this literature that I will engage with in the pages that follow. 
2. SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
Social Structure Change After Mid-1990s 
Human beings as social actors constitute different social forces, which are the 
forces that change the social structure and the organization of society. Social 
structure is the relatively stable relationship among different social forces. At the 
beginning, China is building capitalism from below and characterized as gradual 
reform. The most dynamic sector of the Chinese economy is village industry. This 
industry is typically small-scale; it operates with new firms which are either privately 
owned or can be described as a hybrid property form in which elements of private 
ownership can be detected (Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 1998). The development of 
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capitalism from below depends on the fact that the balance of forces between the 
bureaucracy and the technocracy has not been tilted in the latter，s favor. 
As Gerber points out: "the impact of structural change on stratification has 
received surprisingly little attention in the literature on post-socialist 
stratification,'(Gerber 2002). For example, in China, the public industrial sector 
began a pronounced shrink in the early 1990s that continues to the present. Large 
numbers of these public firms were closed, or were leased or sold outright to private 
individuals, inevitably raising questions about the durability of this presumed 
economic base for cadre power and prosperity (Kung 1999; Li and Rozelle 2000; Oi 
1989,1999; Ruf 1999; Whiting 1999,2001). 
Since 1990s, there have been a series of important changes in Chinese 
socio-economic structure. On trend is that consumption and production are 
transforming from "necessities driven" to "durable commodities driven". The other is 
the recentralization of social resources instead of the diffusion in the 1980s. Both of 
these changes have great impacts on Chinese socio-economic structure, resulting in 
the shift of different social forces as well as the appearance of different unification 
and contradiction relations (Sun 2002b). 
Many of the old definitions and measurements have to be revised due to the 
changes after mid 1990s. For example, with the expansion of Chinese private 
economy, entrepreneurship alone is not enough to measure economic success. In the 
earlier years of the reform, the people engaged in private business could easily earn 
relatively much higher money than those stayed in the commune sectors, no matter 
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what they were doing. Whereas when it comes into the mid-90s, the private business 
become quite competing and only people have the right properties can survive. This 
research will take this into consideration and assume an alternative measurement of 
economic superiority. 
Free Resources and Free Opportunities 
One of the most important results of market reform is the releasing of the 
national control of rare resources, which can be seen in the formation of free 
resources and the extension of free opportunities. As widely discussed, before reform, 
most of the resources are monopolized by the state. One of the goals of system 
reform is the retreat of state power in resource control (Sun 2000). With economic 
growth, scarcity, which is a main characteristic of center-planned economy, 
diminishes. Free resources are growing due to the creation of wealth out of the 
communal system as well as the transformation of the wealth in the old system. With 
the emergency of free resources, a social space out of the state socialist arrangement 
is in the form. People no longer rely on the "organization {zuzhiy\\)iQ bureaucracy or 
the party) to give them a job. On the contrary, they abandon their positions in the 
work units or the collective production teams to pursue their own opportunities of 
self-development. A relatively autonomous market has almost formed. People's lives 
are less dependent on the party-state and work units. 
However, these by no means mean that the "free resources" and "free space" or 
"opportunities" gain the autonomy as their counterparts in the western capitalist 
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world. As researches show, politics and administration are still a very important 
resource with strong radiation and penetration power. Even the other resources that 
mobilize totally in the market are under the great influence of political and 
administrative power (Sun, Jin, He and Bi 1999). 
3. RESEARCH QUESTION 
If one goes through newspaper or magazines published ten years ago or even 
later, it will be very easy to find this kind of reports: private entrepreneurs, who are 
popularly called "dakuan"(very wealthy guys) are always in their luxurious cars, 
giving seemingly unreciprocated gifts to government officials from door to door. 
Using their money, they gain a lot of benefits from officials. My empirical question 
here is whether the relationship between entrepreneurs and government officials has 
changed. What is their relationship {guanxi) like nowadays? Is it more likely to gain 
economic success if one is a party member or has more political background? 
It has been believed for a long time that Chinese private company owners operate 
without the structural protection of governmental support, which is more available to 
state-owned and collective-hybrid organizations. But they will not passively await 
their fate. Rather，by developing relationship as a substitute for the formal 
institutional protection government ownership offers their counterparts, they will 
cultivate close personal relationship with people useful to business, especially the 
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individuals who hold positions in government (Xin and Pearce 1996). 
This particular research attempts to pinpoint the role of political capital in the 
development of private enterprises, and the change of its impacts in 1990s. I focus 
my discussion on the connection between private entrepreneurs and political officials 
in a post-communist society with a deeply developed market. I try to answer these 
questions in this research: what are the impacts of political capital in the growth of 
private entrepreneurs? Whether the impacts change from year to year? How does the 
transitional mechanism between political capital, social capital and economic capital 
works? Particularly, I will focus on whether there is still clientelist relationship 
between government officials and entrepreneurs? Has the clientelist relationship 
changed? If they do, what causes the change? The further theoretical concerns in this 
research include whether the existing social phenomena in China is a transitional 
character or it will be preserved as a new way of deploying resources and pursuing 
social interest. 
This research explains the empirical phenomena within the framework of 
clientelism, distinguishing different types of clientelism by the inter-changing 
mechanism of the two sides. In the following, I will first briefly review the 
developing history of Chinese private entrepreneurs ^ in China since 1949, 
distinguishing three periods according to their relationship with the old system, 
2 According to official document enacted by China State Council in 1988, Private owned enterprise is 
"economical organization owned by individual that employs more than 8 workers". 
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review relevant literature, then formulate hypotheses on the basis of my in-depth 
interviews, and finally, test rigorously these hypotheses with survey data. The 
conclusion and discussion part will echo some broader theoretical concerns, such as 
whether the phenomena in China's market transition are temporary or will they 
become the elements of new institutions. 
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CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF CHINESE PRIVATE 
ENTREPRENEURS 
After 1949, the annihilation of Chinese private economy was achieved by 
political force. After a series of political movements，from public-private joint 
management to total nationalization of private companies, private economy vanished 
for more than 20 years in China, which means that the new generation of private 
entrepreneurs had no kindred relation with previous generations. It was impossible 
for Chinese private economy to avoid relations with political power not only due to 
its historic background, but also because of the government's dominating power in 
redistributing sources, especially scare resources. Thus, private economy had 
countless ties with political power from the very beginning. 
According to their relationship with the commune system, we can roughly divide 
the history of Chinese private entrepreneurs into three distinct periods. In each of 
these periods, the relationship between private business and commune system 
changed, resulting in different social structure and rules. 
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1. First Period: 1978-1992 Out of the System 
At the beginning of the reform, there were two main economic as well as social 
purposes for reviving private business. The first was to solve the serious 
unemployment, which was an immediate issue especially after thousands of youth 
came back from "reeducation" from countryside. Secondly, small private business 
was expected to produce the goods and services that had been neglected by state and 
collective enterprises, and to stimulate these enterprises to greater efficiency through 
competition (Tsang 1996; Tan 1996). 
The genesis of the first batch of entrepreneurs was driven by push factors, 
people started their enterprises because they had few other choices. Among the first 
groups of private business owners many were young people back from countryside, 
who had been waiting for a job for years. Others were mainly "sanjiaojiuliu", which 
means the other unemployed people due to their badness, for example, previous 
criminals. Another part came from residual labor force of rural China due to 
increasing agricultural productivity. Although their backgrounds were greatly varied, 
they had something in common. They were socially, politically, culturally, and 
economically "displaced", which means that they cannot find a place for themselves 
in a unitary society. They grew up out of the system. 
Throughout the 1980s, although there were calls for privatization, government 
emphasis was on how to improve the performance of the State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) by changing their internal governance. Saving the loss-making state 
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enterprise was still the main concern of the government. The private sector was 
always regarded by the government as playing a supplementary role in the economy. 
Private economy had not yet gained full legitimacy. The apparent contradiction 
between Marxist ideology and private ownership has not been satisfactorily resolved. 
It aroused a lot of disputation in the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP). The 
central government assumed a quite conservative tolerance policy towards private 
sector, refusing to ensure its ideological legality. 
The ideological problems of labor exploitation and income polarization 
associated with private business had serious repercussions on policy implementation 
and had constrained the entrepreneurial development (Tsang 1996). Private economy 
was permitted to exist simply because of its economical function. It was only after 
1987 that private economy was officially accepted as the complement of socialist 
economy, but private enterprises still could not have the same status as their 
counterparts in redistributive sector. Their situation is especially worse after the 
political movement in 1989. In this period, central government's attitude toward 
private economy waved from conservative tolerance to half affirm its legitimacy, and 
then to the severely suppression due to the 1989 movements. 
As for private entrepreneurs in this period, they still had trouble in bargaining 
with administrative departments, especially in applying visa, getting permission or 
banker's acceptance credit. 
Considering the uncertain environments, owners and managers being the same 
person, it was not difficult to understand that Chinese private entrepreneurs share a 
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common fear: in the absence of adequate legal protection of private property rights, 
they were constantly concerned about possible hostility directed against them in a 
future political campaign and about the possible appropriation of their assets. This 
can be seen in their reluctance to make long-term investment for business expansion. 
They would rather spend their returns on their personal consumption, investing in 
foreign banks or bought Cadillac or Lincoln automobiles, unwilling to reinvest for 
business expansion. Although they had relatively higher income, private 
entrepreneurs' social status was marginal. Case studies show that most private 
entrepreneurs had no intention of passing their business on to their children. They 
had the feeling that their social status was low and still valued jobs in commune 
system, taking their children out of the family business to elevate them through 
education into the bureaucracy or professionals (Shi 1993). In this sense, strategic 
orientations of Chinese entrepreneurs more resemble opportunistic middlemen than 
modem capitalists (Shi 1993； Tan 1996). 
To survive, private entrepreneurs must try to get the patronage of political power, 
resulting in rampancy of rent-seeking activities. Whereat, corruption became the 
most serious social problem. "Local power is personalized to such a degree that the 
law is identical to the officials in power, and legality is the specific way of 
employing such power. Thus the scope of private entrepreneurship is laid down by 
the practice of local bureaus, and the public reactions toward them concern their 
‘fairness，，rather than their legality" (Bruun 1993). 
During this period, puny private economy was only a limited complement 
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compared with mainland China's dominating state owned economy, developing itself 
in the aperture of redistributive system all along, without any influence to the 
operation of the old systems. On the country, it was always constrained by the old 
system. Although on local level there were some alternatives as supporting policies, 
central government only acquiesces the growth of political economy conditionally. 
Government monopolized the country's economic resources; private business 
activities were limited to personal services and some other unimportant industries. 
What's more, it had no political legitimacy. To deal with the uncertain environments, 
private entrepreneurs totally depend on their personal connections with government 
officials to seek patronage and protection. The power relation between these two 
social forces is unbalanced. Local officials can harass private entrepreneurs as they 
wish and the latter can do nothing about it but to bribe and establish a relationship 
with them. 
Considering these conditions, their status must be very frail, taking the famous 
political events of 1989 as a good example. After June 4 1989, private entrepreneurs 
and self-employed businessmen, which were defined as the class basis of 
"anti-revolution mob", were the objects of a series of political check and purge. 
Under such a high-pressure political hit, private economy declined dramatically 
(Yang 1998). 
2. Second Period (1992-1997): Intertwine With the System 
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After Deng Xiaoping's visit to the south in 1992, the private economy 
experienced a groundbreaking development. In the "go into business" upsurge, 
many former government officials and intellectuals abandoned their jobs and entered 
the private sector. They not only strengthened the private economy, but also 
improved the average quality of private entrepreneurs. 
Because this new part of private entrepreneurs originally came from the 
privileged sector of redistributive system, they had greater affinity with the old 
power system. Most of these private entrepreneurs obtained their advantages through 
power-money exchange and had close relation with some officials. Solinger 
describes a "symbiotic relationship" between entrepreneurs running larger private 
firms and officials staffing the lower bureaucracy; entrepreneurs give officials 
income through bribes and other payments, while officials give entrepreneurs access 
to capital in the state structure (Solinger 1992). How ever, although the two sides' 
interaction was quite frequent, or even rather close sometimes, their interaction and 
communication were almost based on personal level without any effective 
institutionalized channel. 
Coming into the end of 1980s, the performance of SOEs was getting worse and 
worse. They could not be the main tax resource of government. On the country, they 
became a heavy burden for the central state's financial budget. It was in this situation 
that the legal status of private enterprises gradually changed. Accordingly, the private 
sector mushroomed and the composition of private entrepreneurs changed, from a 
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previously social group with relatively lower education level to a social group with 
higher education background than the country's average level. Till 1999, more than 
20% of them have college or higher education. 
Meanwhile, reform measures such as lease contract and incorporation 
potentially led to privatization of the old economic sectors, especially Town and 
Village owned enterprise (TVEs) (Yao 2001). Real privatization started after Deng 
Xiaoping's visit to the south in 1992. As in the case of many other reform initiatives, 
privatization was first started from localities and finally sanctioned by the central 
government. Large-scale privatization of state or collective assets was still 
insignificant, initial changes in ownership composition proceeded by gradually 
liberalizing restrictions on private entrepreneurial activities (Peng and Luo 2000). 
Formal policies began to totally affirm the legitimacy of private economy, and a 
series of practical policies, which are beneficial to private sector, were enacted. 
Generally speaking, in this period, the CCP and the central government affirmed 
private economy's status as "the important part of socialist economy”，making its 
environment more predictable. But the enforcement of these policies was very poor. 
Actually, before 1997's 15 '^' conference, Chinese government's statutes about private 
economy were unstable, and the policies had no institutionalized and legalized 
protection. A lot of policies and rules lack long-term efficiency, and varied greatly in 
different parts of the country. These situations not only made administrative officials 
more arbitrary in explaining and enforcing central policies, but also fosteraged 
officials' predatory behaviors on private entrepreneurs (Chan and Qiu 1999). 
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In this period, the entrepreneurial context was still characterized by turbulence 
and change. Such an environment brought about many niches unfulfilled by the state 
planning mechanism, and allowed entrepreneurs to perform two critical activities: 
connect different markets and answer market deficiencies. However, that do not 
mean the Chinese private entrepreneurs lack the spirit of entrepreneurship. Previous 
researches indicate that the existence of many unfulfilled niches in former centrally 
planned economies characterized by shortage, coupled with aggressive strategies， 
increased an entrepreneur's chance for early survival, similar to what has been found 
in their Western counterparts. What's more, even under the uncertain conditions 
characteristic of China's current mixed economy, Chinese private entrepreneurs 
assume strategies consistent with the traditional profile of entrepreneurs, which is 
characterized by innovativeness, proactiveness and risktaking to deal with regulatory 
hostility, dynamism, and complexity (Tan 1996). All these lay the potential 
possibility of private economy to influence the central planning system by changing 
game rules and institutional settings. 
On local level, the relation between entrepreneurs and officials was even closer, 
and therefore more complicated. The interests of local government officials and 
enterprises overlapped, especially in rural China. Prompted by the fiscal pressures on 
local governments as a result of the fiscal reforms, particularly by the 1994 
tax-assignment reform, local governments were eager to promote local industrial 
growth. Apart from absorbing rural surplus labor and contributing to the provision of 
communal welfare to local residents, rural enterprises provided local governments 
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with tax and non-tax revenues to finance their expenditure obligations. In return, 
local governments provided preferential aids to their enterprises in the form of tax 
and credit privileges, and also protected local enterprises from central authority 
(Kwong and Lee 2000; Oi 1999). In this light, Oi makes further argument that 
mutual dependence rather than predation was a more apt description of the 
relationship between local governments and local enterprises (Oi 1999). 
Liu Yia-ling describes a new "interest convergence" between officials and 
entrepreneurs. In the effort to stimulate private business, local officials sheltered it 
from restrictive central policies and let entrepreneurs register their enterprises as 
collectives in order to bypass restrictions on private business (Liu 1992). This 
phenomenon was very popular and famous in this period. It was well known as 
“wearing red taps". This is a kind of camouflage without any veil. Although they 
could take shelter form taxes and regulatory impositions by paying village 
governments to register them falsely as collective enterprises, private entrepreneurs' 
false registration put the legality of their ownership in an ambiguous status. They 
consequently wanted a way out of their arrangement (Unger and Chan 1999). 
On macro level, the decline of state owned economy provided thriving private 
economy more space to develop in more industries. In some industries, private 
enterprises even became dominating. It was obvious that government was more and 
more dependent on private economy, which means that private economy was no 
longer unimportant complement, and its development was no longer due to the 
concession of central government. Contrarily, not only economy, but also social and 
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regime stability must rely on the growth of private economy. Up to then, it was 
impossible to assume anti-privatization policies no matter what ideological 
disputation arose. Private economy gained its own political influential force through 
its strength, winning the ability to change the existed system, especially the ability to 
change its own relationship with the establishment. 
However, this period is featured of chaos because of the growing bargaining 
power of private economy. The policies are always changing. What is legal today 
could become illegal tomorrow. Private entrepreneurs are at loose ends. If they abide 
by the rules, it will be very difficult for them to survive. The only right choice is to 
get out of the line. So they try to avoid these rules and realize their goals through all 
kinds of illegal or unwarrantable methods, including bribing the government 
officials. 
3 Third Period (1997-now): New System in Form 
The 15th CCP conference came to the conclusion that private economy can and 
must contribute to socialism. Private economy was accepted as a very important 
component of socialist market economy. "Three representatives" rely on private 
economy. 
Actually, Chinese government had not firmed up its stand on private property 
rights until the end of 1990s. Starting in 1994，"enterprise transformation，，(ga/z/n) 
began to spread to the whole country. The content of gaizhi included contracting and 
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leasing, the two methods used before, as well as new methods such as selling to 
private owners, employee-holding, incorporation, listing on the stock market, 
restructuring of internal and external governance, and bankruptcy. By international 
standards, gaizhi qualifies as a property rights revolution although this revolution has 
been largely silent (Yao 2001). Facing criticism that it led to the loss of state assets, 
the government seemed to put more emphasis on developing the private sector itself 
rather than on using privatization as a means to reform the collective sector. 
Due to the development of market and increase of free resources and 
opportunities, private economy depended less on government. They can obtain 
almost all they want in market. In some areas, most of the factory owners considered 
the local government as of limited and tangential importance to the success of their 
business. In rural China, Unger and Chan observed a weakness of leadership and a 
loss of community cohesion. "The very nature of this private industrial development 
has affected the texture of relations between the local Party-state and residents" 
(Unger and Chan 1999). 
In their case study of Xiqiao, Unger and Chan find that the private owners there 
felt little need to wine and dine officials, or to ply the local officials with gifts to 
secure their patronage, nor did they feel it to be of any particular advantage to 
subordinate themselves to the officialdom in other ways in order to survive and 
prosper in their business. Unger and Chan introduce this phenomenon just to indicate 
that the private sector has expanded to carry social and political weight. I have 
similar finding in my interviews. Private economy has achieved advanced 
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development that they can create their own spaces of expansion. They will not be 
easily frustrated by shifting policy any more. In the mean while, they could influence 
the policy-making procedure according to their own interests, both rules and results. 
Actually they succeed. 
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In answer to the enduring questions on political capital in transitional economy, 
a growing body of literature has emerged over the last two decades that can be 
broken down into three perspectives. 
1 MARKET TRANSITION DEBATE 
Market Transition Thesis 
The concern for the transition from socialist plan economy to market economy 
dates back to the core concepts presented by Polanyi: redistribution and non-market 
trade, which consist the main characteristics of socialist redistribution economy 
(Polanyi 1944). 
Based on Polanyi, Victor Nee raises his classical Market Transition Thesis (Nee 
1989). Nee views Chinese market reform as a transition from a plan economy to a 
market economy in which the two economies are defined in ideal-typed terms as 
logical opposites (Kornai 1992; Nee 1989). The core idea of Market Transition 
Thesis is that the main impetus of change in mechanism of stratification in 
post-socialist countries is due to the emergence of market institution, in which the 
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redistributors relatively lose some of their privilege (Nee 1989; Cao and Nee 2000). 
Nee notes that China's transitional economy is characterized by weak capital 
market structures, poorly specified property rights, and institutional instability, of 
which a lack of coherent business laws is an example. These characteristics make 
market exchanges uncertain and costly (Xin and Pearce 1996). For the current 
transitional period, Nee presents the idea of a hybrid organizational form—the 
marketized redistributive firm. Under the conditions of partial reform, marketized 
firms enjoy a transaction cost advantage over alternative governance structures. 
Changes in the institutional environment stemming from the spread of markets and 
the changing structure of property rights, however, increasingly favor private firms 
(Nee 1992). 
Market Transition Thesis stresses the change of power structure between the 
state socialist redistributive elite and economic actors as a key process in shaping the 
post-socialist stratification order (Nee 1989). It argues “entrepreneurs, managers, and 
professionals in this market sector are likely to challenge the redistributors' 
monopoly over elite positions, resulting in a relative decline in the advantage based 
on political power" (Cao and Nee 2000). The shift to the market mechanism reduces 
dependence on superordinate bureaucratic agencies, as producers and consumers 
increasingly get needed goods and services through markets (Nee 2001). 
The basic argument lies in that with the process of market transition, the relative 
advantage of political capital will decline. They believe that in a transitional period 
political position could maintain their advantages and even expand them, but in the 
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long run the advantages of political power will nonetheless shrift to the new 
market-oriented private entrepreneurs (Nee 1991,1996). The basic focus of this line 
of research is on the outcomes (usually defined in terms of income) of entrepreneurs 
relative to other economic actors in these transforming socialist economies. 
However, Nee's theory is ideas and concepts created with the reference of 
western capitalism, its argument full of idealization and linear prediction of market 
transition. For instance, market transition is characterized by private property, legal 
equality, horizontal transaction, voluntary exchange, and price calculation, all of 
which cohere around the principle of supply and demand. The central planned 
economy involves public property, bureaucratic hierarchy, vertical transitions, and 
exchange by central fiat, which coheres around the principle of redistribution in the 
state structure (Wank 1999). What is more, Nee's empirical research is based on a 
regression with only 400 cases, which also causes criticism of its statistical 
reliability. 
Facing so many criticisms, Nee revises his thesis repeatedly, from partial reform 
to hybrid organizational forms. However, he still insists that the discontinuity of 
political capital will happen in the future. In his most recent work, he admits that 
"those with political capital and those with market power can both benefit from the 
market reform, and it is only when market reaches a certain degree of dominance and 
maturity that the latter overshadow the former in terms of economic advantages" 
(Nee 2002). 
Inspired by Nee's "Market Transition Thesis", the transformation of Chinese 
31 
redistributive system to market system has been the focus of debates in academic 
community ever since then. Nee's Market Transition Thesis emphasizes the role of 
emerging markets that compete with and undermine state socialist redistributive 
economy and alter the stratification order. With deeper understanding of market and 
redistribution systems, researchers become aware that the possibility of the two 
systems to be integrated in one society and the unpredictability in future 
development. Therefore, Nee tries to incorporate social institution and structure into 
his theoretical framework and employ new concepts and mechanisms, continuously 
revising Market Transition Thesis. "Unfortunately, as these concepts of mechanisms 
pile up in Nee's arguments, one increasingly loses sight of how they are interrelated 
and what their implications are for the internal logic of the theory" (Zhou 2000b). 
Since mid 1990s, based on the accumulation of empirical researches and 
progress of statistical models and techniques, two lines of arguments have been 
developed to refute Market Transition Thesis，s claims regarding the declining 
significance of redistributive power and political capital. On one hand, there is new 
advancement in previous social stratification frame, in which Zhou Xueguang's 
article in 2000 is most impressive. Although many researches have been done, most 
of them are based on the data of rural China. Tests of market transition arguments in 
the urban context are at an early stage (Nee 1996). In this particular article, Zhou 
bases his arguments on panel data of 4,730 urban residents drawn from 20 cities in 
China (Zhou 2000a). One feature that distinguishes this article from other researches 
on this topic is the author's explicit aim to identify competing processes and their 
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interactions, as well as to highlight the interconnectedness among these processes 
and to insist on understanding them in relation to another. 
Political Economy 
Another approach jumps out of the framework of social stratification and begins 
to consider the link mechanism and mutual relationship between redistribution 
system and market system. These two categories do not separate, nor do they repulse 
each other. Rather, they coexist in a very peculiar as well as subtle way. Moreover, 
they integrate in local level. They develop alternative conceptualizations of the 
change processes—local corporatism (Oi 1990，1992; Nee 1992; Lin 1995), path 
dependence (Stark 1992)，network capitalism (Boisot and Child 1996) and politics of 
workplaces—that cannot be simply reduced into Nee's market transition logic (Zhou 
2000b). 
These scholars emphasize various aspects of the political economy of 
transformation in which political and economic institutions mold emerging economic 
institution. They argue that the ongoing transformation processes and emerging 
economic institutions are circumscribed by and intertwined with existing political, 
economic, and social institutions. They believe that "socialism" is a special social 
form with its own institutional logic and motivation of development. Chinese reform 
will not fundamentally change the existing institutional background and structural 
frame. They view power as an institutional element of the emerging market economy. 
Because market reform is from upside to downside, from central to local, the 
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redistribution power in the old system will definitely influence the results of the 
emergence of market. Even private entrepreneurs without any prior government 
position need to cultivate access to officially brokered resources to improve business 
performance (Wank 1993, 1995b, 1999). They argue that emerging market 
economies lack the expectation-enhancing institutions of "mature" market economies, 
such as universal laws and impartial courts. And even if such institutions did exist, 
many contracts would be unenforceable in courts of law because they entail activities 
deemed illegal or dubious by the state (Wank 1999). 
According to political economy approach, with the development of market, 
officials，especially local government officials have more financial basis of their 
power. The impacts of political capital maintain. Previously advantaged groups 
maintain their advantages by successful conversion of political capital into individual 
private wealth. They convert advantaged positions into new forms of post-communist 
privilege. They realize this conversion either by entering the moneymaking business 
themselves or by providing benefits to certain entrepreneurs to exchange some 
money (so called "power-money" exchange). 
Different from simple observation of power-money exchange, Oi carefully 
details how county government, the lowest level of the territorial-administrative 
hierarchy, reacted so positively to the national reform imperative because its 
economic as well as political interests were well served by supporting the 
introduction of enterprise and the market. It worked because the party-state at county 
level was able to turn itself essentially into a business enterprise corporation, and had 
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the organizational capacity and local authority to change economic structures. 
The concept of local state corporatism, in which local officials play a leading 
role in developing rural areas, is central to Oi's argument, in which she tries to figure 
out the institutional foundations of Chinese economic growth. Oi's conceptualization 
highlights the collectivist coordination of economic activity by local governments. 
They redistribute "profits and risk, thereby allowing the rapid growth of rural 
industry with limited resources"(Oi 1999:12). However, it also emphasizes the ways 
in which as economic growth started to pick up pace, local government also 
encouraged the development of private enterprise, but under its own tutelage. The 
result has been a corporatism in local areas that ensures a community of interest 
between the party-state and private enterprise. The key question for Oi then becomes 
how this relationship will evolve in the future and whether indeed it will even be 
possible for local government to maintain and this is also my question in this 
particular paper. 
Nevertheless, the local state corporatism Oi describes is about the relationship 
between local government and TVEs. Oi believes that collective ownership could act 
as an alternative of individual ownership to guarantee market economy and it 
provided local authorities with an economic cushion and structured the relationship 
between enterprises and local governments. For the collectively owned firms, 
contracting left the rights to the residuals with the village or township government. 
Situations may be different for the private firms or firms over which the manager has 
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rights to the residual. 
The point of departure of the political economy approach is not monopoly over 
resources but cadres' economic role in industrializing villages. This account regards 
power as an institutional element of the emerging market economy. They believe that 
with the development of market, officials, especially local government officials have 
more financial basis of their power. Oi maintains that market allocation in an 
unreformed political system creates new opportunities for patronage and corruption, 
altering but not diminishing the power and privileges of officials (Oi 1989). She 
further argues that decollectivization and fiscal decentralization provided party 
officials of the localities counties, townships, and villages with the 
incentives to act as entrepreneurs and to promote rural industrialization in many 
areas of the Chinese countryside. As a result, the corporatism practiced by local 
officials has become effective enough to challenge the centrality of the national state 
(Oi 1999). 
Meanwhile, because emerging market economy lack the expectation-enhancing 
institutions of "mature" market economies, such as legal system and property rights; 
it engenders patron-client ties among local actors in state and society to reduce these 
uncertainties. Clients seek patrons in the bureaucracy for political protection as well 
as for commercial advantages. They believe that even when such institutions are 
formed in the future, the previous influence of political capital has already been part 
of the face. 
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Their researches indicate that the shift to markets should enhance returns to 
human capital, entrepreneurship and political position. Specifically, political position 
is an asset comparable to human capital, and like entrepreneurship it is likely to yield 
increasing returns as a market economy expands due to the fact that cadres have 
more usable resources with the expansion of local economy. Rural economic 
development magnifies the advantages of cadre households (Walder 2002). 
Political Markets 
William Parish and Ethan Michelson believe that accompanying the process of 
economical transformation emerged political market. "In the transition, the 
liberalization of political markets is often as important as the liberalization of 
economic markets" (Parish and Michelson 1996). 
Prior to reform, some groups of workers and industries were privileged in 
bargaining with management and the state bureaucracy. Due to these historically 
institutional reasons, there are informal bargaining mechanisms of some workers. So, 
Inequality in income and social services depends less on the market than on the 
bargaining power of different social groups. 
There is a continuing need to have linkages with state bureaucrats and state-run 
enterprises. One way to spread risks in an uncertain environment with few 
well-specified property rights is to include current and former state officials in one's 
economic network. Once established, these networks may well have a life of their 
own that provides a kind of path dependence. This continuity, or path dependence, 
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suggests that entrepreneurs with strong network ties to state firms and state 
bureaucrats, as sources of raw materials, marketing outlets, and official protection 
will be greatly advantaged. One should expect continuity rather than rapid shifts in 
current arrangements. Local administrators may well continue to hold onto 
considerable local power—not only despite, but because of marketization (Parish and 
Michelson 1996). That's to say, marketization leads to the continuity of officials' 
power. 
Basically, both political economy and political market accounts hold the view 
that the power of political capital will continue, and will be transformed into 
economic capital in direct or indirect ways during market transition. 
Summary 
Market Transition debate has been ongoing, with both sides adding new 
concepts and statistically sophisticated evidence into their arguments. The pivotal 
difference between Market Transition Thesis and Political Economy is whether 
departures from a centrally planned economy are likely to proceed with or without 
fundamental changes in the mechanism of stratification. Nee's Market Transition 
Thesis builds on Polanyi's (Polanyi 1944; North 1981) insight that economies are 
embedded in definite institutional arrangements. Political market view discussed the 
internal structure of organization. Will the people have more bargaining power 
maintain this power over the terms of exchange? Nee insists that market exchange 
enhances the bargaining power of producers (Nee 2001). 
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All these researches are intended to pinpoint the mechanism of institutional 
change. We can see that as a discussion of income determination of rural or urban 
population, Market Transition debate has almost come to an end. However, the 
theoretical insights of Market Transition debate are still useful in other researches, 
especially when considering that transitional mechanism is still far from clear. 
What's more, the ongoing market transition debate has been focused on the returns to 
human capital and political position, without distinguishing the subtle process of 
transition. They have not considered the consequences of other changes, i.e. 
structural changes. It has no specified description of the transitional process. 
Technically, it is hard for income determination analysis to separate agricultural 
income from non-agricultural income. Actually, neither education level nor political 
capital can really influence agricultural income. This research avoids this problem by 
tests of returns to different factors on the success of private business. 
Up to then, the researches are conducted in the theoretical framework of social 
institutional transformation, exploring the effects of different variables that decide 
income and the connected social stratification and mobilization. However, it has been 
overlooked for a long time that income is but a indirect indicator of the consequence 
of market transition, which is a complex process including three aspects: 
decentralization, marketization, and property rights reform at the enterprise level 
(Peng 2001). "I question whether the focus on the two dependent variables, income 
and income inequality, is what one wants for social change theory. Can they give us 
any clue about the shape of emerging institutions? Are these variables linked to any 
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body of theory?" (Oberschall 1996) The focus of this research the development 
of Chinese private economy, is a concrete transitional process with alternative 
measurement of economic superiority, may contribute and broaden the current 
debate. 
2 NEW CLASS THEORY—FROM A PERSPECTIVE OF CAPITAL 
Since coming into being, New Class Theory has aroused a lot of controversies. 
Although developed by Gouldner's view of the alliance between the technical 
intelligentsia and humanistic intellectuals, the term "New Class" was initially coined 
by Michail Bakunin in analyzing the possible social consequences of the Marxist 
scenario of socialism. It's mainly a theory about the composition of elites in 
communist countries and the struggles among the different elite groups. Some 
scholars have summarized the different waves of this theory (Szelenyi and Martin 
1988). All New Class theorists claim that post-capitalist society will be a new class 
society in which a new class, other than the proletarian, will rule (Szelenyi and 
Martin 1988). But people with what kind of capital are more likely to become 
members of the New Class? In the following I will briefly discuss New Class 
Theory's approach towards different kinds of capital and their transformational 
mechanism. That is to say, intellectuals who own cultural capital, officials who own 
political capital and technical officials who own both, which part is more likely to 
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have more privilege in communist system. I will mainly discuss the formation of 
New Class in socialist systems, leaving its counterparts in western world 
unconsidered. 
Dominating Cultural Capital 
This approach is represented by Bakimin and Machajski, the anarchists of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bakunin argued that the complexity of 
the knowledge a socialist government-run economy and society require would 
inevitably lead to rule by scholars and intellectuals (Szelenyi and Martin 1988). 
Machajski believed that in socialist society, privilege would be based on the 
monopoly of knowledge. They contended that intellectual was trying to use the 
working-class movement to smuggle itself into a position of class power. There will 
be a new class; a new hierarchy of real and pretended scientists and scholars, and the 
world will be divided into a minority ruling in the name of knowledge and the 
immense ignorant majority (Szelenyi and Martin 1988). The socialist society that 
will emerge would be an inegalitarian as capitalism is, except that here privilege 
based on private capital ownership will be replaced by privilege based on the 
monopoly of knowledge. That is to say, the privilege of economic capital will be 
replaced by the dominance of cultural capital. Cultural capital can bring political 
capital. Those who have cultural capital can also have political power. What Bakunin 
and Machajski worried about is that this New Class will abuse this power. They will 
only serve the interests of intellectuals, having no contribution to the emancipation of 
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the manual workers. However, they failed to predict the failure of this New Class 
movement. The result of Marxist revolution is a dictatorship of the Stalinist 
bureaucracy rather than class rule by "socialist scholars". 
That's exactly what happened when communism firstly originated. Taken China 
as an example, the CCP was originated by a group of left wing intellectuals. But up 
to the time when the People's Republic of China established, the intellectual 
temperament had been removed (Gao 2000). In the following socialist reconstruction, 
the intellectuals suffered from a series of political movements, then coming to the 
extreme point of the Cultural Revolution, in which intellectuals encounter the most 
grievous persecution. 
Dominating Political Capital 
Djilias systematically analyzes the birth of the New Class in his famous book 
The New Class. He argues that modern Communism began as an idea with the 
inception of modem industry. It flourishes in those countries where industrial 
development has not yet happened. To fulfill its goal of industrial revolution in a 
backward country, especially if it has no assistance and is hindered from abroad, the 
revolutionary party must concentrate all domestic resources in its own hand. 
Nationalization of industrial property and the land is the first concentration of 
property in the hands of the new regime. However, it is the bureaucracy who 
formally uses, administers, and controls both nationalized and socialized property as 
well as the entire life of society. The role of the bureaucracy in society consigns it to 
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a special privileged position. The abolition of private ownership was a prerequisite 
for industrialization, and for the beginning of the new class. However, without their 
special role as administrators over society and as distributors of property, the 
Communists could not transform themselves into a new class, nor could a new class 
be formed and permanently established. Depending on the position they held on the 
hierarchical ladder, the new class obtained the best housing, automobiles, and similar 
evidence of privileges. 
The state-bureaucracy constituted as the new dominant class. Those who hold 
structural position have political power as well as advantages in all aspects. The base 
of the class power of the managerial technocracy lies in its collective ownership of 
the means of production. 
This is the story when the Communist parties set up their own regime and begin 
to establish the social-economic system to fulfill their goal of industrialization in 
backward countries. Political capital can bring advantages in all aspects of social life. 
In China, this period is from 1949 to 1966，the launch of the Cultural Revolution. By 
the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Communist China had witnessed a process of 
bureaucratization. This bureaucratization went to such extent that what Djilas 
described came true in China. Maoist intervention through the dramatic movement 
was a kind of charismatic breakthrough from the bureaucratic routinization. It is said 
that the Cultural Revolution is an anti-bureaucracy movement, in which the "mass", 
who are underprivileged whether in social, economic or cultural senses, fight against 
the privileged authorities who held positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy (King 
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1977). Although it is a tragic in Chinese history, it did weaken the bureaucracy 
group. 
Dominating Teleological Knowledge 
During 1970s’，the intelligentsia in Central Europe, by virtue of its monopoly 
over "teleological knowledge," formulates claims for class power, and in the 
post-Stalinist epoch there has indeed been a trend for the bureaucracy to open up, and 
join forces with the intelligentsia into becoming a new dominant class. A new type of 
knowledge (adversary culture, teleological knowledge, cultural capital, etc.) is 
gaining ground and the possessors of this knowledge are in a radically new 
relationship to domination. It is assumed that the possessors of this new type of 
knowledge can now make an autonomous bid for power. In the meanwhile, 
bureaucracy attempted to use technology to legitimate itself and try to promote 
engineers into bureaucratic positions. Based on the socialist redistribitive systems, 
economic power, political power and cultural capital can be combined with each 
other and interchanging became very common. Knowledge is the media of 
intellectuals to mobile between different administrative positions. 
There emerges a new class composed of intellectuals and technical intelligentsia. 
The revolutionary intelligentsia can substitute itself for the proletariat and emerge 
from the revolution as a new dominant class. The increasing power of the technocrats 
and scientists derive from the type of knowledge it possesses. "We argued there 
that the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe, by virtue of its monopoly over 'teleological 
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knowledge,' formulates claims for class power, and in the post-Stalinist epoch there 
has indeed been a trend for the bureaucracy to open up, and join forces with the 
intelligentsia into becoming a new dominant class" (Szelenyi and Martin 1988). 
This wave of New Class theories explores the changing nature of knowledge. A 
new type of knowledge is gaining ground and the possessors of this knowledge are in 
a radically new relationship to domination (Szelenyi and Martin 1988). However, 
technocrats were still finally defeated by the bureaucrats. For example, in China 
there is a dual path for bureaucrats and professionals (Walder 1995b). 
Reunification of Cultural Capital and Political Capital 
With the spread of managerialism，In Making Capitalism Without Capitalists, 
Eyal，Szelenyi and Townsley explore the class formation and elite struggles in 
post-communist central Europe. They believe that the social attributes of actors, their 
class capacities, and the historically contingent outcomes of struggles between them, 
are likely to be decisive for explaining the particular kind of capitalism that is being 
built in Central Europe. 
They conceptualize pre-communism, communism, and post-communism as 
three different stratification regimes defined by the dominance of different types of 
capital. And post-communism is a historically unique system of stratification in 
which cultural capital is dominant. Further, the transition to post-communism is a 
shift from socialist rank order to capitalist class stratification. Converting devalued 
forms of capital into new, more valued forms is the preferred way individuals cope 
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with changes in social structure. They also argue that one is usually in a much better 
situation to convert a devalued form of capital if one is already well endowed with a 
revalued type. That's to say the former elites are more likely to become new elites 
than others. Those who have both cultural capital and political capital, technocrats in 
Central Europe, are mostly privileged in a post-communist society. 
They define capitalism as a class-stratified system in which economic capital is 
dominant, and communism as a system in which social capital -institutionalized as 
political capital was the major source of power and privilege. With the decay of 
state socialism and the rise of post-communism, the importance of political capital is 
declining, the role of cultural capital is increasing, and economic capital is sufficient 
only to locate its possessors in the middle of the social hierarchy. 
These ideas are very profound and with deep insight. Nevertheless, that may be 
the case in Central Europe, but not exactly the same in China. China is different in at 
least three aspects. 
Firstly, the transition to capitalism was undertaken in the context of a relative 
highly developed "civil society". They describe the advantages of civil society as a 
discourse in transition. However, as have been widely discussed for a long time, 
China has yet to become a civil society (Deng 1996, 1997; He 1998; Chan and Qiu 
1999). There is no social space or basis for different kinds of elite groups to bargain 
or reunite. Developing market economy in an environment that civil society has 
grown to certain degree, the previous elites, dissenters and market elites have 
effective channel to negotiate, which is not Chinese case. 
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Secondly, their book lays particular stress on the behavior of former elites in 
transition. In their discussion, the struggle and liaison of elites' power form the new 
social structure. Different capital owners fight and reunite to find the best solution of 
their future. In China, a certain percentage of private entrepreneurs are at first out of 
the system�，they were by no means elites in the old system. What's more, Central 
Europe has no systematic dependent relationship as in China. 
Thirdly, "The unique feature of East European development after 1989 is that is 
does not simply allow or encourage the growth of new private sector. In all East 
European countries, the privatization of the public became state policy after 1989. In 
China the public sector is maintained" (Szelenyi and Kostello 1996). Actually, not 
only public sector is maintained, private sector's legal existence is but gradually 
confirmed. In a long time, private business has to wear a "red hat" for protection. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, their environments are unstable and full of turbulence. 
With all these differences, does China's transitional process have the same 
mechanism and outcome as Central Europe? The answer is quite suspicious. This 
research will try to identify the distinctive characteristics of China's emerging private 
sector, by reference to China's business system and markets, transitional structural 
change, and government within that system. 
3 CLIENTELISM 
3 Survey data show that 2/3 private entrepreneurs previously are farmers, ordinary workers or unemployed. 
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Dependent Clientelism Walder and Oi 
In the classical work Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in 
Chinese Industry, Walder firstly presents the term "clientelism". Based on the theme 
of rational choice, he analyzes social control in the intricate work-unit system of 
China and explains why there were so many activists participating in political 
movements and extra productive work. He deems that on the one hand, there are 
strict political controls in the units. One the other hand, because workshop directors 
have redistributive power for many welfare and works, many people try to cultivate a 
special clientelist relationship with these cadres to get better treat. "Party branches 
develop stable networks of loyal clients, who exchange their loyalty and support for 
preference in career opportunities and other rewards. The result is a highly 
institutionalized network of patron-client relations that is maintained by the party and 
is integral to its rule: a clientelist system in which public loyalty to the party and its 
ideology is mingled with personal loyalties between party branch officials and their 
clients" (Walder 1986:6). From Walder's view, before reform, the state impels 
political movements and collective production by coercion in work unit (Danwei) 
system (effective to all the workers) and selective encouragements (effective to 
activists only) (Walder 1986). 
Correspondingly, Jean Oi analyzes the relation between the state and peasants in 
rural China. Previous researches of political participation point out that the formal 
channel of meaningful participation is very weak in developing countries; individuals 
mainly rely on informal network based on personal relationship to pursue their own 
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interest. Based on these conclusions, Oi focuses on how personal relationship 
influences the goals and products of state policy. She comes to a conclusion similar 
to Walder's: there is clientelist relationship between farmers and village cadres. She 
describes the concrete forms of clientelist tie in a planning economy society strictly 
controlled by equalitarian ideology. She believes that in village level of socialist 
society, the communist system works by assuming clientelist ties that have maximum 
profit rather than minimum risks. 
Both Walder and Oi take an institutional position on clientelism. Institutional 
analysis is most definitely borne out by elite studies. For Walder, patron-client 
relations within the work unit (danwei) is a response to the situation where powerful 
officials controlled access to scare, rationed necessities such as housing, non-wage 
benefits, and even promotions (Gold, Guthrie and Wank 2002) .The clientelism they 
uncover is in the state-socialist China before reform, an interchanging process of 
political loyalty and economic benefits and used as a strategy in the prior command 
economy for citizens to deal with shortages and inequalities by influencing officials' 
allocation decisions. This clientelism is featured as dependent in a totalist society. 
Relations between patrons and clients were stable over time. Clientelist networks 
also created social cleavages between clients and non-clients, inhibiting the 
development of organized opposition to the state (Wank 1995b). What happened to 
this clientelism described by Walder and Oi as neither traditional nor inherent to 
Chinese society in the great changes of China's market transition process? Now that 
it is related to specific institutions, will it decline due to the institutional changes? 
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Symbiotic Clientelism 
In his research of private entrepreneurs in Xiamen, Wank continues the 
discussion of clientelism. He states that the revival of private economy has not 
resulted in the decline of clientelist relationship. On the contrary, it causes a new 
commercialized type of clientelist relationship, the nature of which is symbiotic trade 
of commercial wealth and political power. Wank focuses on the ways that 
entrepreneurs have aligned themselves with state agents to create a political 
economic coalition between the private economy and officials in the transforming 
economy. The relationship Wank describes here is no longer patronage relationship, 
but symbiotic. Officials exchange political power for economic benefits and 
businessmen exchange economic capital for political protection. Wank further makes 
the case that the more marketized regions of China have not eliminated clientelism, 
as some had predicted, but on the contrary, had just marked a "transformation within 
a clientelist political order" (Wank 1995b). 
Clientelist transacting arrangements change with the growth of private firms. 
The attainment of a certain threshold of economic capital accumulation generates a 
shift in a private company's emphasis on patron-client ties to facilitate further growth 
(Wank 1999). He proposes a new concept symbiotic transaction to describe 
this new relationship. The clientelist ties through which private business operates 
differ from pre-reform clientelism not only in new commercial calculations but also 
in changing dependence: citizens' dependence on officialdom is much reduced as 
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officials and local governments are increasingly dependent on entrepreneurs and their 
firms for certain resources (Wank 1999). 
He argues that the reason for the existence of the new clientelism lies in the 
administrative function of the government. The businessmen need official assistance 
to get access to licenses, resources, venues, protection, and other favors, while the 
officials need the businessmen to stimulate the economy to demonstrate the official's 
competence in the new reform environment. 
Thus, rather than a chaotic and liminal stage of a "partial transition" that is 
neither market or plan, we can see the deepening and institutionalization of a market 
economy organized through an equilibrium in which competition consists in good 
measure of capacity to obtain particularistic support from state agents in commercial 
endeavors. The symbiotic clientelism in which private business operates not only 
reflects the utility-maximizing interests of entrepreneurs and state agents but also 
constitutes broader economic and political structures. For entrepreneurs, these ties 
are of ongoing benefit, even as the earlier emphasis on profit seeking in public assets 
controlled by the bureaucracy gives way to enhancing security and information 
through ties to local governments. The ties are also innovations by which local 
governments obtain support, enabling them to forge new links to the market economy, 
which, in the southeast region, include links to the financial capital of Chinese 
overseas. These strong local webs of affiliation are development coalitions that 
heighten the autonomy of locales from the center and the bargaining position of 
certain societal economic actors vis-a-vis local state agents (Wank 1999). 
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Wank amply describes how the symbiotic clientelism works and its relationship 
with China market reform. He believes that the success of China economic reform is 
not due to different communist tradition compared with other post-communist 
countries, nor gradual reform, but because of clientelism. However, Wank fails to 
explain why previous institutional culture leads to clientelism. He takes it as an 
obvious presupposition. 
Another problem of Wank is that he is used to supporting his arguments with 
illegal opportunist activities. In his book or articles, he emphasizes rent-seeking, 
bribing and corrupt activities. The personalized "power-money" exchange is only 
informal strategies. If we stop our discussion in this level, we will fail to detect the 
ongoing structural change. Based on Wank's logic, there will be no possibilities of 
routinization of China transitional society. Empirically, there will be no end to 
corruption. So, it is necessary to reconsider Wank's conclusion as well as his 
standpoint. 
Organizational Clientelism 
In his 2002，s paper "Business-State Clientelism in China: Decline or Evolution", 
Wank differentiates different ways of getting political connection. In addition to pull 
guanxi (la guawd)’ he dwells on reputation (mingyu) and localistic networks, which 
are alternative, sometimes more effective and less time-consuming ways to gain 
government support. He further points out that there is new organizational local 
network between firms and bureaus. In localistic network, the coordination between 
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private firms and government bureaus is as part of the broader agendas and policies 
of the bureaus rather than as the isolated actions of single officials to circumvent 
standard procedure on behalf of entrepreneurial clients. Private businessmen do not 
seek to influence individual officials to make non-standard decisions; links of locale 
are organizational support from bureaus through the routinization of non-standard 
administrative procedure in bureaus' daily operations. This is not a case of scattered 
officials supporting entrepreneurs by making deviant decisions to favor them but a 
case of entire bureaus defining their practical policies and operating procedures to 
support private firms in ways of varying legality. 
He points out that although clientelism may have no use in transactions between 
buyers and sellers, it does have effects on key processes as market entry and 
contractual enforcement. 
From symbiotic clientelism to organizational clientelism, Wank presents a 
picture in which political connection plays a central role. He believes that as a new 
private economy emerges, clientelism is not abandoned. Instead, it has more basis of 
existence in the market economy environment. Guanxi practice may decline, but 
clientelism can be conducted in other forms and maintained to form the 
characteristics of Chinese market economy. He realizes the shift from personal to 
organizational clientelism. However, he still believes that these activities have no 
defined rules. At least he has not figured out the logic behind the formation of the 
networks, on which the organizations build. The example in his article—Fairwell 
(Yuanhua) Group, is notorious as the largest illegal interest group in China. The 
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organizational clientelism Wank describes is still part of speculative activities that 
cannot be institutionalized. 
4. S U M M A R Y 
In this chapter I try to distinguish three approaches about political capital. First, 
I try to identify three different types of argument in Market Transition debate, 
demonstrating where the strength of each theory lies and particular insights one can 
gain from them. The main concern of Market Transition debate is whether political 
capital can maintain its privilege. It examines the structural aspect of institutional 
change, whether the previous political order will change. Second, I retrospect the 
development of New Class theory. It focuses on which capital has the most 
advantage and the transformation and combination of capital. Third, Clientelism 
examines the internal structure of institutions in market transition, the relation 
between people who have and who do not have political capital. 
Although from different perspectives, the core question of all these three 
theoretical approaches is: whether political capital could maintain its privilege during 
market transition. While they all generally agree that political capital is the most 
essential feature of previous political order, their views vary on the extent to which 
political capital is shaped by institutional contexts and on its future in the reform era. 
Market Transition approach debate over this question from the structural views. Nee 
believes that entrepreneurs groups and individuals who were formerly barred from 
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advancement in the state socialist bureaucracy and economy gain chances for social 
mobility through emergent labor markets and private entrepreneurship. The growth 
of market institutions causes a decline in the significance of socialist redistribution 
power even in the absence of fundamental change in the political order. Dependence 
on the established elite declines. 
Political economy approach believes the previous political order will not change. 
According to proponents of this perspective, the initial advantages of the 
redistributive elite are such that this elite will come to dominate the post-socialist 
stratification order. The old redistributive elites occupy strategic positions in political 
markets, which enable them to adapt flexibly to emerging markets and capture a 
disproportionate share of the rewards (Walder 1996; Rona-Tas 1995; Parish and 
Michelson 1996). Former cadres were best placed to convert state-socialist privilege 
into economic capital. Initial elite will come to dominate the post-socialist 
stratification order. 
For the proponents of New Class theory, intellectual elites, especially those have 
both political capital and cultural capital will become the new elites. They concern 
about the elite structure, seeking the agents of new elite group. Clientelism believes 
there emerge a new political order based on the cooperation between new market 
elites and previous political elites, who become the most privileged part in the 
transitional process. They try to illuminate how such maintenance was achieved. 
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CHAPTER 4 PRINCIPLED CLIENTELISM 
——PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM IN-DEPTH 
INTERVIEWS 
In existing literature, it is believed that the characteristics of China's transitional 
economy are weak capital market structure, without clear property rights or 
institutional instability. Previous researches indicate that the more instable the outer 
environments are, the more dependent will the enterprises be on informal connection 
to gain resources and protection. This is so-called structural support. Compared with 
SOEs and TVEs, the new-rising private enterprises are more likely to be subject to 
the harrying of government departments. It is also more difficult for them to get 
resources. To seek protection or to get the resources unavailable in market, such as 
loan, low-cost raw materials, private entrepreneurs have to conduct rent-seeking 
activities. They develop personal relations with government officials to supply the 
gap of formal institutions. However, with the development of market to the extent 
that almost all the resources can be accessed in market, the establishment of legal 
system and the supporting attitude of central government, why private entrepreneurs 
still try to pull guanxi with officials? Maybe they have given up rent-seeking 
activities? Or has the direction of relation changed due to the change of strength on 
both sides? As Wank understands, clientelist network is a stable structure composed 
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of people's consensus on social trust. This new relation is different from traditional 
clientelist relation because of the fact that the power of both sides has switched. 
Local low bureaucrats and private entrepreneurs achieve new cooperation on the base 
of interest convergence, leading to so-called symbiotic clientelism. 
This research borrows from these theoretical traditions, but differs from and 
builds upon them by imaging the presence of principled clientelism. How private 
entrepreneurs can survive and prosper in an economic system with neither protection 
of property rights or capitalist institutions. Here is the endeavor to figure out what 
agents are building Chinese private economy, and on whose behalf and for what 
purposes they act. 
1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS AGENT 
In previous researches, government officials were conceptualized as patrons, or 
portrayed as preyers. But these are not what I saw when doing fieldwork. My 
interviews were mainly done in Shengzhou City, located in the east of Zhejiang 
Province and known as the "Home of Necktie". The yearly necktie output reaches 
200 million, accounting for 80% of the yearly necktie output of China. It is only 
about 3 hours' drive from Shanghai, and about 1.5 hours' drive from Hangzhou, 
Ningbo or Jinhua. 
When I arrived at the small city, there was a movement originated and leaded by 
local government called "Excellent Investment Environment". The main purpose of 
57 
this movement is to attract more business opportunities and investment for local 
enterprises. The CPC Shengzhou Committee and Shengzhou People's Government 
formulated series of policy documents including "Finance Supporting policies", 
"Favorable Policy For Land Use" and "Polices For Agricultural And Sideline 
Products Intensive Process". 
It seems that government does all these for the good of the whole local economy. 
But actually, only a group of selected enterprises can enjoy the benefits. 
Government's protection and service are not equal to every enterprise. In recent years, 
Government shifts its emphases to the propping up and breeding of "main 
enterprises". What is more important is the change of principles behind. If there was 
actually rent-seeking activities and patronage relationship based on social network at 
the initial period of market reform, the propping and breeding policies now are more 
institutionalized. This research indicates the conversion of local administrative 
departments. 
Incentives 
Local officials are rational actors who respond to incentives and existing 
constrains within the limits of their cognitive ability to evaluate alternatives and 
process information. With decollectivization and fiscal reform, local officials at the 
county, township and village levels were given incentives to generate new sources 
(Oi 1999). Officials' salaries and general economic well being depend on the 
prosperity of local economy. 
58 
In a communist system, local officials have what Murrell and Olson call an 
"encompassing interest" that is much stronger than that held by officials in 
democratic regimes to make their economy grow rapidly. In such situations the 
person with dictatorial power has ‘‘a property right in his society". Just as the owner 
of a firm, they have an incentive to make the firm as valuable and productive as 
possible (Oi 1999). So, local governments have the incentives to serve as promoters 
of private industrialization. Not just the local populace's prosperity but also a good 
part of the village-level revenues depend upon this (linger and Chan 1999). Central 
government sticks to the “Economy centered policy". The annual cadre evaluation 
determines local officials' chance of promotion. Officials need their economic 
achievements to get political reward from the party state. It is in economic 
development where the central policy is compatible with local interests. Local 
government officials hustle to help develop private enterprises far more than others^ 
They become agents of the development of local economy. 
In recent years, the market competition becomes intense. The period that 
whatever you do, you can earn money has gone. Enterprises have to rely on whatever 
they have to survive. The plights faced by enterprises and the consequential problems 
make local officials intercede economic activities more deeply in the name of “center 
on economic development". They become active actors of market economy and thus 
maintain their influence of economic domain. It is a reasonable way of government 
to execute its economic administration function in the condition of lack of property 
4 At first local governments relied on TVEs which they have claims for residuals. But in recently years, with the 
decline of TVEs and debt crisis of TVEs, TVEs are experiencing a "property rights reform". A lot of TVEs take 
off their "red tap" and register as private enterprises. 
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rights obligation. 
Resources and Services 
Local governments have lost their control of rare sources and they do not own the 
enterprises either. They have no rights to the residuals of private enterprises. But they 
still have other sources that are usable to control private entrepreneurs. Local 
governments have changed their role of regulator into provider of collective service. 
(1) Credits 
In the earlier years of reform, governments control all the important original 
resources and energy. Nowadays the situations have been greatly improved. But 
governments still have the absolute control of credits. It is impossible for private 
entrepreneurs to gain any loan without the support of governments. To come into the 
market to collect financing, enterprises also need the permission of government 
departments. 
Governments control banking institutions such as government support funds and 
savings and loan cooperative. They can decide loan money to which enterprises. 
Usually they provide some loan for those who need the first bulk of money and to 
those they deem as contributive to they plan of local economy. For example, the 
Shengzhou People's government decided that agriculture related industries are 
important to the further development of local economy. When private entrepreneurs 
who want to open a factory in that area apply for government loan, they will be given 
privileges. 
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(2) Administrative power 
Although these are private enterprises, government officials are still able to 
control them and intervene their direction of growth. They choose certain goals and 
projects that have privilege over others, relegating to certain private enterprises. 
Using their administrative power, officials create opportunities and provide political 
legality to these enterprises. 
They could use their control of bureaucratic inputs, for example licensing, entry 
permission and product certification. Tax breaks and loan deferrals are also effective 
ways to control enterprises. Nevertheless, these methods are more often used as 
determent to punish enterprises they regard as not cooperative. For example, in 
Shengzhou there was an enterprise owned by a family. The owners refuse to join a 
contact made by the Economy and Trade Department. Days later they had to face a 
tax checking and were uncovered that they had evaded tax for years and the amount 
added up to 750,000. Including fine, they had to pay more than 1,000,000. Checking 
tax is one of the most effective ways of severely suppressing the enterprises they 
deemed as illegal. 
(3) Authority 
When trust becomes an important factor of expanding trade, private enterprises 
are underprivileged because they lack the basis of credibility. Their transnational or 
transregional social connection is especially poor. As public authority, local 
governments offer a premium of trust. They become an authoritative intermediate. 
Although governments have never act as a direct part of economic cooperation, it is 
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undeniable that their participation provide a reliable guarantee. 
Making collective contracts is a good example. They seek order contracts for 
the entire village to make certain items and individual households perform 
specialized tasks necessary to produce the finished product. Instead of directly 
participating in the market as individuals, the village contracts with larger corporate 
organizations. They use their control of collective contracts and resources to bring 
the private sector into the corporatist fold (Oi 1999). 
Local governments also establish transregional and transnational connection for 
local enterprises and act as intermediate of enterprises' transnational or transregional 
expansion. An official told me that whenever he was on business trip, for example, to 
Shanghai or Hong Kong, he would take any chance to recommend the enterprises of 
Shengzhou to relevant entrepreneurs. He does it in the request of local government 
rather than entrepreneurs. The Shengzhou entrepreneurs even have no idea of that 
until the Shanghai or Hong Kong enterprises contact them for business cooperation. 
They also provide favorable policies for transnational cooperation. For example, 
in Shengzhou they have this policy: the new foreign-sino joint enterprises, 
foreign-sino cooperation enterprises and solely foreign-owned enterprises will share 
full allowance of the local left part of the income tax for the first three years, and in 
the next two years, 50% of for allowance. For the domestic investment enterprises 
from outside Shengzhou, they will also share the favourable policy as follows: 
Productive projects between 30 million and 50 million RMB yuan share one year's 
full allowance, and the second year 50%. Productive projects between 50 million and 
100 million RMB yuan share two years' full allowance, and then 50% for the next 
three years. 
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(4) Information and Technology 
The bureaucracy is an information grid where government officials are the 
primary nodes in the network that provides information to local enterprises, 
especially about central state policy change. Additionally, local government officials 
actively sought cooperative relationships for their rural industries. They also arrange 
and join all kinds of product exchange conference to get more information of new 
technology to improve the quality of local enterprises. 
Table 1 summarizes the sources and service provided by local governments. 
Using a combination of inducements and administrative constrains characteristic of a 
state corporatist system, they manage to promote the private sector while at the same 
time preventing it from becoming an economic elite over which they had little 
control. 
�Table 1 here> 
Who Are Chosen? 
Government officials are no longer protectors of private business based on 
personal ties, nor blackmailers to innocent private entrepreneurs. They are also more 
than regulators 5. They actively sought cooperative relationships for their rural 
industries. They selectively target certain enterprises for development. Assistance are 
no longer given equally or to all. 
5 In mature market economy, governments are mainly regulators. 
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On one hand, governments select some of the most influential enterprises (based 
on their ability in manipulating market) to interpose management. Enterprises more 
likely to receive this assistance are those deemed most profitable, competitive and 
expanding. Through their participation, government realizes its management of the 
whole local economy. Supports are also offered to industries that are not profitable 
but contribute to social interests such as the provision of employment for the 
village's surplus labor. 
Another important part is to provide special favorable institutional environments 
for the projects or industries they regarded as important. In Shengzhou, they believe 
the industrialization of agriculture is important, so they have some policies for 
agricultural and sideline products intensive process. Foreign investment projects for 
the agricultural and sideline products intensive process in the Economic Zone can 
share the land price 80,000 RMB yuan per mu and meanwhile they can share the 
favorable policy for land use for foreign investors. Besides, they can also share the 
favorable policies for production, daily life and services. They also have "Special 
Promises From The Bureau of Agriculture". 
On the other hand，as for the smaller enterprises, local government chooses to 
neglect them unless they disturb the normal order of market. 
2. PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS AS CLIENT 
Even in a fully developed market economy, large corporations are enmeshed in 
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a complex system of financial institutions, business services, accountants, advertises 
and market researchers, employment agencies and headhimters, subcontractors, 
franchises, newsletters and information analysts, etc. which is now largely missing in 
China and other socialist transition countries. Though missing as discrete 
organizational units, the functions associated with these institutions are performed by 
party-state cadres and officials and new-style wheelers and dealers in the parallel 
horizontal transition system (Oberschall 1996). The handling of political issues such 
as taxation, finances, bank lending, and investment, puts added requirements on the 
skills of entrepreneurs. Lacking a well-developed democratic system in which their 
views can be heard by government, the entrepreneurs must resort to a variety of 
methods to advance the economic causes of their villages or enterprises (Gilley 
2002). What's more, at first there were a lot of spaces for new private business, but 
now market competition becomes more and more intense. Free tiny company 
competition has been transformed into cooperation competition. All kinds of social 
forces try to reuinte to defend and reserve a better position of their own. So, although 
the market environments in China have improved a lot, private entrepreneurs still 
find it important to utilize political connection. 
Researches have examined the ways that entrepreneurs have aligned themselves 
with state agents to create a political economic coalition between the private 
economy and officials in the transforming economy (Wank 1999; Hsing 1998): 1) 
Pull Guanxi; 2) Reputation (for example, the Prince's Party); 3) Try to expend their 
own enterprises and make them in the same direction with government's goal, to 
attract officials' initiative connection. 
The first two ways have been discussed a lot in previous literature (Wank 1995a, 
1995b, 1997). The cost of establishing political connection has also been mentioned 
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before. For example, to pull guawci，entrepreneurs spend a lot of time and money in 
establishing personal ties with local or higher officials. Using reputation as political 
connection is the most effective and least costly, but it depends on whether you "have 
a good father". Only those who have ascribed or primordial political capital can 
utilize it. Not everyone can fulfill this requirement. I will discuss the last way in this 
study. I will show that this newest way of getting political connection is not only 
effective, but also less costly. It is based on a new kind of clientelist relationship 
between government officials and private entrepreneurs. 
Political capital results in the differentiation of the entrepreneurs' economic 
achievement, which further lead to different strategies. It is found that the difference 
is according to the capital they own, both economic and political (Tsang 1996;Tan 
2001). I also find that the owners of small enterprises and larger enterprises are 
significantly different in many aspects such as: personal background, the strategies 
they assume when dealing with government and their general attitude toward 
important social facts. 
Personal Background 
When we talk about personal background in China, there are usually two things 
referred to: education and previous position in the CCP or in commune system. 
A. Larger Enterprises 
All the entrepreneurs of larger enterprises I interviewed have university 
education and high position in the redistributive system. Usually they joined the CCP 
before they began their own business, but have actually left the Party for a long time. 
For example, Lin, the owner of the largest and most profitable tie-making company, 
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graduated from Zhejiang Agricultural University, and was an administrative staff of a 
town-owned enterprise before he set up his own business. He began to prepare his 
ties-producing enterprise in 1993. 
Another female entrepreneur Yu, together with her husband, graduated from 
Zhejiang University, which is one of the best universities in China. She told me that 
she and her husband became quite famous in Zhejiang province when they decided to 
leave their previous company and began their own business. She said: 
"Our resignation arouse a hot discussion and argument in media for a long time. 
Zhejiang Daily published a report titled 'why excellent young factory managers 
resign? 
Now the air-conditioners produced by their factory has become one of the most 
famous brands in Zhejiang province. They also have longevity in the CCR But she 
admitted that they haven't attended any party activities such as political studies for 
years. That means they have estranged themselves from the CCP ever since they 
became private entrepreneurs. 
Zhao, who is the owner of a company producing electronic equipment, 
graduated from The University of Electronic Science and Technology of China in 
1990. He joined the CCP when he was a university student but was expelled from the 
Party in 1989. He said: 
"When the movement began, I was among the first students to go to Beijing to 
support them (the students in Beijing). The party leader took me as a bad example 
because I took a bad lead. So they expelled me after 1989. And I never have any 
interest to rejoin the Party again.“ 
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B. Small Enterprises 
Entrepreneurs of smaller enterprises usually do not have university education, 
and previously work as common workers rather than cadres in collective-owned 
enterprises. For example, Qian, 40 year old, is the owner of a company producing 
silk. He replaced his mother's position as a worker when he was still a senior 
high-school student, which means that he had no chance to finish his high-school 
education. At first he worked in his mother's work unit (danwei) as an administrative 
staff. After 1989，when nobody wanted to do sales and marketing, his superior 
persuaded him to take the responsibility. After six years sales and marketing 
experience in the town-owned silk factory, he resigned and began his own business. 
Mrs. Sun and her husband are owners of a factory producing ventilators. They 
have never joined the CCP and have no interest in doing that. They worked in a 
state-owned enterprise as technical workers before beginning their own business. 
They have no university background. Their technique came from their work 
experience in previous work unit {danwei). At first they did all the work themselves 
at home and usually they did some processing jobs for other factories. When more 
and more work is coming, they felt they were out of hands and began to employ 
some workers. After accumulating some money, they set up their own factory. 
Communist system is a system in which social capital一institutionalized as 
political capital was the major source of power and privilege. With the decay of state 
socialism and the rise of post-communism, the importance of political capital is 
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declining and the role of cultural capital is increasing. Based on Nee's market 
transition thesis and the personal background information of these entrepreneurs, we 
can arrive at the following two testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Cultural capital, measured by formal education, has positive 
effects on private entrepreneurs' assets. 
Hypothesis 2: Correspondingly, the impacts of party membership are 
declining. 
Strategy 
Under conditions of expanding markets, economic actors strive to institute new 
rules of competition and cooperation that serve their interests, both through informal 
arrangements and through formal institutional channels. In order to survive, private 
entrepreneurs have developed a diverse range of strategies to navigate the political 
and economic uncertainties of post-communism. Probably the most prevalent 
managerial strategy was an attempt to stand on as many legs as possible. Some of 
them use economic strategies, some of them use political ones, and some of them use 
their relations. In my filed work，I find that larger enterprises generally assume a 
strategy of "you seek and find" and small enterprises assume a strategy of “avoid and 
wait，,. The basic principle of choice is minimum cost, or owners' expectation of 
return to their investment. 
A. Larger Enterprises 
Larger enterprises usually do not say no to government's initiative approaching 
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activities and actively join associations to promote their influence and political status. 
For example, Lin, the entrepreneur mentioned above, said that: 
“/ prefer to keep low key and seldom contact the government or newspapers. 
But government officials always want me to imburse them. For example, my 
enterprise is the main sponsor of the annual Spring Festival party for years. Usually 
/ do not refuse them. It's necessary for us entrepreneurs to redound upon society. This 
city is small and there should be someone to take the responsibility. So the larger 
enterprises with better financial condition should do something. I also promote the 
reputation of our brand by doing that. Because I am famous here and I also have a 
good reputation as well as a good relationship with government officials, they also 
do me some favors. If we have any problem, they will not harrow us. As long as the 
problem is not very serious, they will let us pass. And they also provide development 
opportunity for us. Government officials also want us to do well We have almost the 
same goal. I have good relations with many officials. As you may have noticed, the 
government is leading the 'excellent investment environment movementThe 
intention of this movement is to attract more foreign capital to invest in local 
enterprises. And that's exactly what we need to further expand our company. They 
also want to develop local economy. We help each other a lot. I do my business 
smoothly, without any obstacle. I am a party delegate for years and have the 
opportunity to speak out my opinions. The government needs my cooperation.“ 
Yu, the expressive female entrepreneur told me: 
"I have been elected People ’s Representative and party delegate for five years 
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and have submitted many proposals. In earlier years, I can�t register my enterprise 
as private. We wore a red tap. But the red tap is not good for our development. We 
have to locate our factory in a small village. The transportation and other 
communication were poor. Now we are private. In a bigger place, there is more 
space for private enterprises. Actually we are considering moving to HangzhotA But 
^hat I want to say here is that the status of private entrepreneurs has greatly 
improved. The people 's Representative thing is nothing but a symbol of political 
status. I believe that private entrepreneurs do more contribution to the society than 
civilians, but our status are lower than them. That's unfair. So when I was elected 
people ’s Representative, I regard it as an opportunity to say something.“ 
These cases illustrate that in China successful entrepreneurs are being viewed as 
necessarily suited to political office because of their economic success. 
Before I interviewed her, I was told that she was very active in Women's Union. 
She is an exemplar figure of successful women set up by Women's Union. When I 
ask her about this, she said frankly: 
"I have a very good relation with the Women's Union. Although I don't need 
Women ’s Union 's help, they did make me famous. You know, our products are for 
house use. We should be well known. My reputation saves my enterprise a lot of 
money. We don 't need to spend too much money on advertisement. Advertisement is 
extremely expensive. Newspaper and TV program report my stories a lot, that makes 
my enterprise and products famous too. Usually a large enterprise has high status 
6 The largest and capital city ofZhejiang province. 
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here and government officials also hope us to success. We got some of our projects 
with the help of some government departments, accompanying with some officials in 
charge of economics of external communication.“ 
Setting up exemplar figures is a routine of Women's Union for a long time. That 
means it is an administrative task and part of their annual routine work. It is 
Women's Union's responsibility to set up some exemplar figures to show the 
improvement of women's social status and to inspire other women. The cooperation 
between Yu and Women's Union cannot be regarded as a rational exchange based on 
economic reasons. But they do have what is desirable for each other. As Yu said, it 
just comes naturally. What is happening in other government departments is just the 
same. All the entrepreneurs of larger enterprises have mentioned their experience that 
officials help them to find new opportunities or to get projects. In some of these 
projects they even use the government's resources such as access to land and 
communication channels. Most importantly, local government provides reliability 
and trust for these unknown private enterprises. To develop local economy is the 
most important task of local government. It is also the most important indicator of an 
official's achievement to get promotion. 
All the entrepreneurs I interviewed said that the officials dared not blackmail 
them. Rules and regulations are established and followed strictly. So their good 
relationship and cooperation is no longer direct power-money exchange based on 
personal economic interests, but rather collaboration between two powerful groups in 
nowadays China (Sun 2002a). Moreover, government officials have more motivation 
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to initiate the relation rather than entrepreneurs. As Lin and Yu said, they never tried 
to get involved in any political activities, nor did they seek influence other than 
economic ones. They regard the success of their own enterprise as the most important 
and essential goal. "Success" was defined as to increase business scale. But officials 
and media keep approaching them to make them famous. Large enterprises invest 
more money in political connections. They will not refuse when government officials 
ask for help. Therefore we have another hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Social investment has positive impacts on productivity of private 
enterprises. 
B. Small Enterprises 
Small enterprises have the tendency of avoiding the political domain and trying 
to create their own space. Qian said that: 
"You cannot regard government administration as harassment. It depends on 
how you deal with them. The core point is that you must have sound reasons. Usually 
I argue with them if they treat me biased. But nowadays they are less likely to do so. 
In most cases there are rules or regulations they have to rely on. And we try to avoid 
any direct conflict with them. If they come, they are superiors. Of course I will give 
them anything, such as documents, certifications, they want to inspect. But I will not 
company them myself. I ask other lower staffs to do it. I will treat them a lunch or 
dinner, using my enterprise 's budget. But that's all. No extra money or presents.“ 
When asked whether he has friends from government. He answered: 
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"You know, our company is not that important. It's not necessary for officials to 
know or to have a good relationship with us. And I don 't like making friends with 
government officials if I didn 't know them since my high school days. Yes, I have 
friends in government, but I knew them before they became government officials. I do 
not make extra efforts to know more government officials. It's not necessary. And I 
don 't like government officials. They are different from us.“ 
He also admitted that knowing politics was important. "If you want to success 
in your business, you must understand politics, especially policies of the central 
government. You must have political sense, I was puzzled: what model on earth were 
the central government want to support? The Wenzhou model or the Sunan model? I 
still didn 't figure it out. But it doesn�t matter. I believe that I have to do well with my 
enterprise. So when I was asked to set up a party branch in my company in 1998, I 
refused to do so. I told them that I have no time, nor have my employees. We are too 
busy.“ 
Although he cares about policies, he assumes a soft non-cooperative attitude 
toward political requirements. When he was requested that he must establish a party 
branch in his enterprise, he did so. But he himself acts as the chief secretary. He told 
me that: 
"Now we have Work Union, but it is only nominal, it doesn 't have any practical 
function. We also have a branch of the Youth League and a branch of the CCP. But 
all these are simply nominal existence. You know, workers as well as managers have 
a very high rate of mobility. Who cares about these political activities nowadays?“ 
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“/ don 't think I am a private entrepreneur, I am an entrepreneur. Why people 
always want to distinguish private or collective? Entrepreneurs have done so many 
good things for the society, especially for the local economy. However, the policy of 
the state is still not stable enough. Who knows what will happen in the future? Maybe 
the government will abolish all the favorable policies someday. So, we should play 
the game carefully. Batting the edge ball is the best strategy. For example, avoiding 
tax (bishui) rather than escaping tax (taoshui),” 
"But I do believe that the most important thing of me is to do well in my 
business, to expand the scale of my enterprise. Only if I am big and strong enough, 
Could I have the opportunity and the right to talk about other things.“ 
Another entrepreneur, Li, expressed the same opinion: 
"If government officials come, usually we treat them a dinner. But I don 't think 
it's necessary to keep a good relationship with them by giving them presents or 
something. Because we are not big enough to catch their attention, they don 't spend 
much time in controlling or bothering us either. I believe if my enterprise expands to 
certain scale, we will have more connection with government officials. In earlier 
years, government officials have more harassment. But now, they dare not do so. The 
whole environments restrict government officials a lot in recent years. Personally, I 
do not like politicians, or officials. We are not the same kind of people and don 't have 
common topics...“ 
For Mrs. Sun, she said she didn't have any relationship with government 
officials, and they have no intention to do that either. She said: 
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"We depend on ourselves totally. We never loan any money from the bank, nor 
borrow money from friends or relatives. We accumulate all that we have today. 
Government officials are often arrogant. We don't like their style and have no 
intention to make friends with them. What's the point of doing that? Government 
cannot help us. And nowadays they don't bother us either. We are doing our own 
business. Of course we care about the state ’s policies, especially about tax. We tried 
to take advantage of the policies about drawback (tuishui). We are not ambitious, we 
just want to develop stably.“ 
For entrepreneurs of smaller enterprises, they also got some loan from bank, but 
usually they persuade bank through regulation or various financial incentives to offer 
loans on favorable terms. And bank loan is only a small amount. Most of their initial 
capital came from personal ties such as friends or relatives. Qian said that he borrow 
200,000 RMB from a friend and loaned 100,000 from bank. 
General attitude 
The way entrepreneurs look at this era influences the economic system they 
establish, especially when all kinds of institutions are developed in a society with 
intense ideology of cooperation and authority. For the average citizens in 
contemporary China, the transition to capitalism is happening in a way similar to the 
earlier transition to socialism: through the acquisition and mastery of emerging 
rhetoric, the practice of new activities, and the experience of new social identities 
that come with them. Unlike in the earlier period, however, the power of the CCP to 
define the parameters and significance of each of these realms is increasingly 
fragmented (Jeffery 2002). 
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Summing up interviewees' narratives, there are four issues they regarded as 
most important: 1) The status of private entrepreneurs; 2) The vicious competition; 3) 
The protection of natural environments; 4) The future of their children. 
Larger Enterprises 
Owners of larger enterprises concern more about outer environments and 
long-tem issues. The Woman Model Yu told me that: 
"The most serious problem of our country now is the unrighteous competition. 
Many competition methods you could not even imagine, very cruel “ 
"I am most concerned about the pollution of our environment, for example the 
agricultural poison 's pollution of underground water. The aftereffect can be awful. 
I've submitted several proposals as a people 's Representative to protect environments. 
I think this is the most important task of our society in recent years.“ 
When asked about their self-perception of their status, Lin said that: 
“I never desire high political status, it comes naturally. I think it's ok. It's suited 
with my economic status on the whole. I have been Shaoxing District's Party 
Delegate for five years.“ 
But Yu expressed a different opinion: 
"Nowadays I have the feeling that our society is becoming more and more fair. 
In the earlier years our social status was very low. I had to wear "red tap “ to protect 
my company years ago. Now we register as private. No problem now. However, the 
social status of private entrepreneurs is not high enough. We make more contribution 
to society than government officials, but our status, especially political status is not 
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as high as them. There is still a lot to be improved.“ 
Small Enterprises 
Owners of small enterprises, or bottom-up enterprises, have definition and 
opinions of their own, which can be identified by their attitudes toward major social 
facts. The way they treat their life and their children's future is very realistic. Qian 
said: 
"It's impossible for the CCP to expire in recent years. The initial intention of the 
CCP is good. But local governments do wrong things in actual executing. It is 
understandable that they have trouble in managing such a huge country. ” 
"As for my son, I will provide him with the best opportunities in education. Now 
he is in a boarding school in HangZhou, a foreign language secondary school 
Li: 
"The economic policies of our government are really effective. No matter what 
they are, they work! If the party in power can make the country wealthy and powerful, 
it 's enough. 
Entrepreneurs of smaller enterprises are economic actors who are outside of the 
central power structure. According to Wank and Hsing's researches, they should 
perceive the need to curry favor with officials to develop the extra advantages needed 
in a rapidly changing economy such as China's. But here we find that instead of 
actively cultivating connections, these entrepreneurs of smaller enterprises actually 
refuse to put too many efforts into it. We find that they have already developed 
certain patterns in strategies and attitudes to cope with their situations, consequently 
78 
engendering a new relation between government and entrepreneurs in a clientelist 
political order. 
Agent-client Relationship 
Chinese market economy is leaded by government, which results in the 
phenomenon that Chinese private entrepreneurs' behavior is government 
official-driven rather than market-driven. Government policies influence the future of 
private entrepreneurs. The biggest risk of Chinese private entrepreneurs' is not from 
market, but rather from policies. So, policies predicting is more effective than market 
predicting. 
On the other hand, a research reports that many products' profit rate is 10%, but 
private enterprises' tax adds up to more than 10%. Other than tax, there are about 50 
different kinds of fees on private enterprises. In this condition, private entrepreneurs 
have no choice other than lie about their transactions and income to avoid tax (China 
Economy Annual 1998). Thus, Chinese private entrepreneurs have the "original sin" 
of transgressing the law to earn money. 
Although China's market economy has developed a lot, legal systems and 
contracts are not natural parts of Chinese business behavior, and institutions are not 
yet depersonalized. Therefore, if a private entrepreneur wants to survive, his core 
task is to establish trust and dependability. 
Private enterprises also have the confusion about game rules. In a transition 
economy, there are still too many restrictions. The game rules are not clear enough. 
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Many of the rules and regulations are even self-contradictive. What is legal today 
could become illegal tomorrow. It is well known that if one does something 
according to the rules, he can do nothing successfully. But greater risks will 
accompany these private entrepreneurs if they fail to follow those rules. They are 
even in the danger of inquest and jail. It is said, "following the rules means waiting 
for death, but not following the rules means looking for death". 
Under all the obligations of both sides, an agent-client relationship is formed 
between local government officials and private entrepreneurs. The formation of this 
relationship is the results of a series of interaction of repeatable games. 
3. PRINCIPLED CLIENTELISM 
In recent years, local government and some private enterprises develop an 
agent-client relation, in which local governments are agents of local economy and 
private enterprises are the chosen clients. This relation is the content of a new form 
of clientelism. 
In uncertain institutional environments, private entrepreneurs depend on 
patronage relationship to respond to their less-than-legitimate status, as well as to 
pursue protection of their property right. However, with the stabilization of 
environments, political capital is not as important as it was in the past. Because a 
new relationship comes into being, entrepreneurs need not pursue patronage from 
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government by establishing personal connections with government officials. This 
new relationship is different from the personal kindred relation that Nan Lin 
emphasizes, but a stabilized existence that will not mobilize or shake with the 
changing of particular persons. This new relationship is still a kind of "clientelism", 
but it is no longer exclusive, personal or non-routinized relationship. Governments 
choose to give patronage to certain enterprises, but the process of selecting is based 
on certain universal principles. Enterprises try to gain benefits by fitting these 
principles, rather than brokering, which was most popular in the past. 
I call the new relationship between governments and private entrepreneurs as 
principled clientelism in which universalism breaks the obturation caused by 
personal relationship. Meanwhile, in the construction process of principled 
clientelism, local government is more initiative. To most of the private entrepreneurs, 
their relationship with the government officials is not the entrepreneurs' rent-seeking 
activities, but an impersonal network connection. 
In western market theory，Government's economic function mainly lies in 
administration. But in China, local government officials have very strong profit 
motivation. What lies behind the response of local officials to this clientelism is the 
fact that the level of local economy is the scale of officials' achievement, and it is 
closely related to the implement of other projects. Meanwhile, officials' income and 
social status rely on the prosperity of local economy. Government officials hustle to 
help develop private enterprises far more than others. The tendency of political 
• commercialization here is not only a new image of political exchange, but also the 
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inevitable outcome of political process when governments perform its role of social 
producer. 
However, government has no direct production ability. Through choosing "client 
enterprises", they can supply the gap of controlling economic information and deploy 
resources to their "agent enterprises" to gain ideal economic performance. In this 
process, local government officials consign their economic function to private 
entrepreneurs to realize their own interest pursuing. For the selected enterprises, the 
goal of their production is to have more and easier access to profit possibilities. 
This relationship has institutionalized rules to stabilize itself. Government 
enacts all kinds of qualifications in selecting enterprises. These qualifications 
become compulsory obligations for the enterprises if they want to regale themselves 
on the protection and privileges offered by officials. The institutionalized form 
impulse the new clientelism to universalism (local universalism of course). 
Principled clientelism is the newest development of Walder's description of 
dependent clientelism. The government officials discussed here do not definitely 
have any blood ties with the communist officials. They are new politocracy. This 
institutionized clientelism stabilizes their interaction, making the communication of 
these two sectors more routine and stable. 
Clientelism is by definition unequal because of the intrinsic element of 
reciprocity and obligation. One party seeks some favor, which then obligates both 
parties to continue the relationship. Breaking off a relationship contains a risk to both 
parties. Reflecting Wank's symbiotic clientelism, although symbiotic clientelism 
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cannot be used to describe the relation between government officials and 
entrepreneurs of larger private enterprises in Shengzhou, this does not mean that 
political connection is irrelevant to the new commercial environment. On the 
contrary, political connection still exists between entrepreneurs of larger enterprises 
and local governments, but it takes a new form of principled clientelism, or 
agent-client ties. This principled clientelism is institutionalized clientelist political 
order and is the association of the two elite groups of nowadays China. The nature 
changed from the reliance on particularistic guanxi-Xy^Q to universalistic modern 
orientations. 
4. FROM SYMBIOTIC CLIENTELISM TO PRINCIPLED 
CLIENTELISM 
Transformation in Clientelist Spectrum 
Wank found that the strong desire of entrepreneurs for support from the 
bureaucracy was apparent during his interviews. But in my interview, all the private 
entrepreneurs insist that they depend on their own efforts to develop. It is not 
necessary to get support from the bureaucracy. In Wank's fieldwork, some 
entrepreneurs talked about the support in terms of access to profit opportunities 
including capital and scarce goods. But in my interviews, support is mainly 
administrative convenience and protection from arbitrary sanctions and regulations. 
Moreover，symbiotic clientelism involves almost all the private entrepreneurs. 
They may get personal ties with government officials in different ways, in which 
83 
some are legal, some are illegal, some are ascribed, and some are achieved. But 
principled clientelism only exists between local government and a limited number of 
selected enterprises. Most frequently they are the most influential large enterprises of 
that region. As has been discussed above, the process of establishing this relation is 
not opportunistic rent-seeking activities any more. As for other smaller enterprises, 
they prefer to stand by and avoid the political domain, creating a space of their own. 
Transformation in Clientelist Exchange 
Symbiotic clientelism emphasizes upon the individualized exchanges between 
officials and entrepreneurs for personal advantage that are often blatantly illegal. It 
emphasizes the particularistic basis of the emerging alliance between entrepreneurs 
and officials in China's market economy. It involves an imbalance of power between 
official patrons and entrepreneurial clients. It involves the exercise of discretion by 
officials in allocating resources and opportunities, and it is embedded in personal ties 
(Wank 1995b). In principled clientelism, officials are responsible for local economy. 
They have high developing motivation. The entrepreneurs are selected clients of the 
service provided by local governments. The exchange is not personal but 
institutionalized. The previous illegal part has been removed. The basic principles are 
universal rather than particular. 
In symbiotic clientelism, clients seek patrons in the bureaucracy for political 
protection as well as for commercial advantage such as access to financial capital, 
permission to trade in restricted products and engage in direct foreign trade. In 
principled clientelism, local government is agent of local economy. They seek 
actively and voluntarily in the local enterprises to find clients to give patronage for 
the fulfillment of their economic goals as well as other administrative tasks, 
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developing a structured new relation based on formal principles. Local government 
aggrandizes its role of providing service. Entrepreneurs do not seek patronage. They 
act as executers of government's economic policy. 
In symbiotic clientelism, government officials are patrons, they provide 
valuable information on policy shifts, local administrative matters, insider prices and 
auctions of public enterprises and confiscated goods, and regulatory loopholes, all of 
which help entrepreneurs to conduct business. Officials draw on their personal ties 
with other officials to mobilize support for an entrepreneur within the bureaucracy. 
Entrepreneurs give officials access to material necessities through bribes, salaries, 
and dividends. They also give officials significant career opportunities through 
employment as managers and sales personnel. In principled clientelism, private 
entrepreneurs seldom give individual officials any money, but they do provide large 
amount of money to local government every year as sponsors of all kinds of 
activities and other projects organized by government. Most importantly, by fulfilling 
all the principles required by government, they shape their enterprises into what the 
local governments want and help governments to realize structural transformation of 
local economy. 
Transformation in Clientelist Network 
In symbiotic clientelism, a patron is essential to business success. Entrepreneurs 
who do not cultivate a patron or some other kind of bureaucratic support are unlikely 
to be successful. In principled clientelism, clients and agents do depend on each other, 
but the power relation between them is balanced. Enterprises can still survive and 
develop when escaping from political domain. For the selected enterprises, their 
cooperation is not compulsory, nor do they have any financial responsibility to each 
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other. 
Relations in symbiotic clientelism can be very blatantly instrumental and 
involve large sums of money and valuable commodities. Their relation is "personal 
ties of money". This patron-client relation is based on a cash nexus have thus 
proliferated. In symbiotic clientelism, officials compete to become linked to the 
larger private firms. Entrepreneurs running the larger and wealthier firms are the 
most desired clients, inasmuch as they can pay more for the discretion of highly 
placed officials. However, such competition may backfire because of the competition 
and jealousies among officials over the rewards (Wank 1995b). In principled 
clientelism, relations are still instrumental, but less personal. Actually, because 
enterprises have to fulfill certain principles to be selected and most frequently the 
most influential enterprises are chosen to the privileges provided by government, 
their most important job is to expand and develop their enterprises rather than bribing 
individual officials. 
Summarizing the history of private entrepreneurs and the development of 
clientelism, Table 2 compare different clientelism in aspects like degree of 
dependence, power relationship, and nature of relation, etc. 
�Table 2 he re� 
Why does principled clientelism exist only in rural China? 
The principled clientelism I observed exists only in rural contexts, which means 
small cities and villages like Shengzhou. The difference between urban and rural 
China is a complicated and long story. I will only give several reasons central to my 
argument. 
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Classical property rights theory maintains that clearly assigned private property 
rights are important for the smooth operation of a market economy. But in 
contemporary China, there is no clear property right, nor stable external environment, 
why private economy can flourish? It has been found that private entrepreneurs use 
clientelism to cope with unstable environments. When situations change, the forms 
of clientelism change correspondently. 
That China's economy is undergoing a dramatic rationalization is indisputable. 
However, the degree of rationalization varies in different part of China. In rural 
China, the forces of modernization that tend to introduce institutions, such as law, 
contract and other means of resort when trust fails or is unavailable, have not moved 
to a point where the old-fashioned means of coping can be abandoned. So, when the 
most important factor to make economic activities possible cannot be effectively 
established, the traditional ways remain active. 
Urban entrepreneurs often "work the system" in ways that reinforce a closed, 
undemocratic political process. Rural entrepreneurs, by contrast, are often working 
from the outside, which requires them to engage in more adversarial and open 
politicking (Gilley 2002). "We theorize capitalism without capitalists as a distinctive 
new strategy of transition adopted by technocratic-intellectual elites in societies 
where no class of private owners existed prior to the introduction of market 
mechanism" (Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 1998). In rural China, on the contrary, it 
is capitalists without capitalism. 
Guthrie illustrates that the closer an organization is to the central government, 
the less likely the general manager of that organization is to see guanxi as continuing 
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to be important in the reform era (Guthrie 2002b). Organizations in urban China are 
definitely in higher structural positions. Rural regions, therefore, maintain the 
influence of political connection, although in new forms. 
5. PRINCIPLED CLIENTELISM HYPOTHESIS 
Up to now, a lot have been discussed about principled clientelism. Thus there 
are hypotheses based on this theoretical approach: 
Political connection is more available to larger enterprises. Through the 
principled clientelism, they are privileged to access of information and profitable 
opportunities. That's to say, 
Hypothesis 4: Political connection has positive and increasing effects on private 
entrepreneurs' economic success. 
Furthermore, because the new principled clientelism is less personal, so former 
cadres, who have more personal connection with officials, cannot fulfill their 
privilege. 
Hypothesis 5-1: There will be less and less former cadre become private 
entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 5-2: Former cadre's impacts decline. 
Hypothesis 6: Political connections are more likely to have significant impacts 
in rural areas. 
88 
Chapter 5 MEASUREMENT, DATA AND METHODS 
1. METHOD 
This research employs both quantitative survey and in-depth interview. 
Although both quantitative and qualitative researches share basic principles of 
science, the two approaches differ in significant ways. Each has its strengths and 
limitations, topics or issues where it glitters, and classic studies that provide 
remarkable insights into social life (Neuman 1997). This research tries to combines 
the features of each (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Since there is only partial 
overlap, a study using both is fuller or more comprehensive. 
In chapter 4，the qualitative in-depth interviews are used to identify the detailed 
causal process of changing and describe the image of their relationship and the 
process of its formation as well as the motivation of both sides. We have also 
developed testable hypotheses. 
Then quantitative statistical models are to test whether political capital is 
important to private entrepreneurs, and will exam the change of its effects from year 
to year. “Private firms operating under hard-budget constraints display higher 
productivity through economizing on production costs, yet their access to formal 
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sources (i.e. state-owned banks) of capital and factor resources is least 
favorable"(Nee 1992). So I will estimate both production function and regression of 
firm scales. 
2. DATA 
The unit of analysis is the individuals. The data set was obtained through a 
series of surveys of Chinese private enterprise conducted by Zhang Houyi (Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences), Yi Yuanzheng (All China Industry and Commerce 
Federation), Dai Jianzhong (Beijing Academy of Social Sciences) and Li Lulu 
(Renmin University of China). The survey in 1993 is the first nation-wide sample 
survey of private-owned enterprises and their owners. The enterprises were 
randomly selected. For the 1993 survey, 1440 enterprises from 31 provinces were 
sampled on the basis of proportional probability. After 1993, the survey was 
conducted every two years. The latest available data is collected in 2000. For the 
1995 survey, 2869 enterprises from 31 provinces were selected. For the 1997 survey, 
1946 enterprises from 22 provinces were selected. For the 2000 survey, 3073 
enterprises from 31 provinces were selected. The questionnaire, designed for their 
study of private entrepreneurs, was subjected to validity tests and shown to be an 
effective and reliable instrument. I have done some preliminary data cleaning, such 
as deleting outliers, influent points, to make the results more robust. I have also run 
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production function estimate to test the quality of the data. After deleting some cases 
with missing or outlying values on key variables, for all the four years, the sum of 
coefficients of labor and capital are equal to or a little larger than 1. These results 
accord with the requirements of Cobb-Douglas production function. 
<Table 3 here> 
Qualitative data were collected by means of structured interviews I conducted in 
Zhejiang province, where private economy is most prosperous in China. I have done 
in-depth interviews with 12 private entrepreneurs and several government officials. I 
have also had informal conversation with some employees, ordinary citizens and 
journalists. 
3. MEASUREMENT 
For all the surveys, nearly identical questionnaires were used, and they included 
questions regarding the annual sales income, capital composition and political ties. 
The key variables are defined in the following. 
Dependent Variable 
Sales income. 1 use the logarithm of last year's total sales income of the 
enterprise (Chinese yuan/year) as the dependent variable. The data set has the 
information on the respondents' last year profit, revenue, tax, fees and shares. To 




Political capital. Political capital is a concept having been widely used and 
discussed. In the past, no matter what the assumption is, it is always measured by 
party membership or position, for example, cadre status. However, capital is the 
accumulation of past investment. As a kind of capital, political capital should at least 
have these characteristics: (a) extension in time; (b) deliberate sacrifice in the present 
for future benefit; and (c) alienability (Arrow 2000). 
This research will employ a different definition of political capital. Political 
capital of Chinese private entrepreneurs is defined as the resources one can get in the 
old system. There are two reasons: firstly, party membership is a too simplified 
reduction that has been realized by many scholars. Secondly, as for private 
entrepreneurs, party membership is especially inapplicable. Because private property 
ownership contradicts to classical communist ideology, it is not until 2001 that 
private entrepreneurs can legally join the CCP. Although some private entrepreneurs 
were party member before they set their own business, they left the party domain, 
especially routine party activities, when they became private entrepreneurs. That is 
why their political capital cannot be measured by party membership, but is best 
embodied in their ability to gain resources in the distributive system. It is the 
relationship with officials that matters, not personal political credits. 
I also distinguish two types of political capital. One is the exogenous political 
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capital they have accumulated before they enter the private economy sector; the other 
is the endogenous political capital they try to gain by intentional interaction with 
government officials. The latter is famous as Chinese guanxi practice, which is easy 
to be confused with political connection. The political connection in this research 
includes both ascribed? political connection and achieved guanxi. 
Thus, political capital is measured mainly by both party membership and 
political connection. Former cadre and social investment will also be used as 
complementary measurement. 
Education. 1 use the years of formal education as a measure of human 
capital. 
Party membership. 1 use a dummy variable (CCP membership=l) to 
indicate Communist Party membership as political capital. 
Connection. 1 use father, closest relative, closest friend, spouse, and adult 
kid's position (cadre or not and rank) to estimate private entrepreneurs' political 
connection. 
Social Investment. The cost of cultivating connections with officials. I use 
the logarithm of the amount of money used in socializing activities as an alternative 
measurement of political capital. 
Controlled Variables 
Asset. The logarithm of last year's total asset of the enterprise (Chinese 
7 For example, the political connection of Prince Party is ascribed. They do not need to do anything, their family 
name alone can provide them with great advantages, which common citizens can not even imagine. 
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yuan/year). 
Labor. The logarithm of last year's total number of employees. 
Gender. 1 use a dummy variable (male=l) to examine gender-based 
variations in the annual profit of private enterprises. 
City. 1 use a dummy variable (big, middle city=l; small city, village=0) to 
distinguish whether the main activities of the enterprise are in rural or urban region. 
Year. How long has the enterprise been existed. 
Age and age^. 1 use the first- and second- order effects of age to measure 
the effect of work experience or seniority, as part of human capital. 
Former cadre. 1 use dummy variables "Administrative cadre=l, Economic 
cadre=l; others=0" to measure whether the entrepreneurs were cadres before they set 
their enterprises. 
4. STATISTICAL MODEL 
I will run OLS regression to test the impacts of political capital on the growth 
(scale) and productivity of private enterprises. The models are defined as: 
a. Production function: InY = a +pilnL+P2lnK + yP +6X + e 
b. Reduced form: InY = a + yP +5X + e. 
In model (a), "Y" stands for per worker gross value output or sales income, "P" 
for political/social capital/investment/status, and "X" for control variables, K for 
capital input per worker, L for total number of employees. 
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"P" stands for a vector of independent variables such as party membership, 
political connection, former cadre, etc. To explore the impacts of different variables 
on enterprise performance, we only need to evaluate "P". 
All the equations are estimated via the linear regression method in SPSS 
procedure. 
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CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, I will present the results of quantitative data analysis. Part one is 
mainly descriptive analysis, which is to give a picture of the composition of private 
entrepreneurs. In part two, I will test hypotheses with regression functions. 
1. THE CHANGING PROFILES OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS 
There are diverse candidates who could constitute a new propertied class: 
former cadre, technocrats, new politocracy, opinion-making intellectual elite and the 
new entrepreneurs who are starting small business in the hope that they will grow big. 
In China, who are more likely to become private entrepreneurs? Who are these 
owners? Are there identifiable owners? 
96 
Initial Occupation 
<Table 4 here> 
�Table 5 here> 
Table 4 reports that the majority of private entrepreneurs are ordinary workers 
or farmers before they began private business. The percentage of former 
administrative cadre and economic cadre is declining. Administrative cadres decrease 
by 3.3% , from 1993's 6.0% to 2000,s 2.7%. When we add the percentage of worker, 
farmer，self-employed and unemployed together, as Table 5 shows, it becomes 
clearer that private business is mainly occupied by the new bottom-up entrepreneurs. 
More than 2/3 private entrepreneurs' first job is farmers, ordinary workers or 
unemployed. Even in urban regions, about 15-20% private entrepreneurs' first job is 
fanner. 
These bottom-up entrepreneurs are not from the privileged class of China, 
because private business has yet to move to the point of such an attractive occupation 
that the privileged individuals in the commune system give up their advantages and 
attend the newly rising private sector. The declined percentage of former cadre is due 
to two reasons. First, the economic conditions of officials have been improved a lot. 
The upsurge of doing business appeared in the 1980s has fallen back to a normal 
level. Cadres partly regain their prestige, although with a lot of changes in its content. 
Second, now is not as easily as before to transform political advantages into 
economic profits. Thus, hypothesis 5-1 is supported. 
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Trends of Political Credits 
�Table 6 here> 
In Table 6 we find that men are dominating. Almost 90% private entrepreneurs 
are men. And there is no decline signal of this domination. The figure hardly changes 
from 1993 to 2000. Considering the fact that gender equality is a special policy of 
communist China, the decline of women's status can be regarded as an indicator of 
the diminishing political influence. Although men are dominating，urban China has 
more female private entrepreneurs than rural China. This is reasonable. Women are 
better educated in urban regions than in rural region. 
We also find that people with less political ties enter into private sector, from 
7.9% in year 1993 to 2.9% in year 1997. In the beginning of 1990s, we have about 
13% cadre in private entrepreneurs, but at the end of 1990s, the figure declines to 7%. 
Fewer cadres join (or stay in) the private sector. However, the percentage of party 
member increases. In year 2000，almost 1/5 private entrepreneur is party member. It 
is quite noticeable considering the fact that only 5% party member^ in national 
population. In urban areas, there are more private entrepreneurs with political 
connections. There is also a larger part of urban private entrepreneurs with cadre or 
professional background. Rural private entrepreneurs have less political connection. 
This is also reasonable because urban regions have more government officials and 
other economic cadres with higher position. But a larger part of private entrepreneurs 
8 The ratio of 2000，s party member to population. 
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are party members in rural regions than in urban areas. Considering the relatively 
greater amount of party members in cities, this difference is even more significant 
and worth further analysis. 
As for education level, Private entrepreneurs' educational level is increasing. It 
is higher than average level. The education level of urban regions is also higher than 
that of rural China. The proportion of college or above education holders increases 
from 5.3% to 11.8%. 
2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Results 
I first examine patterns of private enterprises' assets determinants in four years 
using a multivariate regression model. Table 7 reports the parameter estimates of the 
key covariates in four years. 
�Table 7, 8 here> 
Education With regard to formal education, there were significant returns to 
all four years. And these returns increased from year to year. In urban China, 
education has a higher return than rural China. The estimates shows that in year 1993, 
one year formal education had 13% (exp<.112>) more sales income, in year 2000, it 
increases to 22%. 
Gender Male has positive and significant impacts. Considering the relative 
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privilege of women in communist China due to political reasons, the resurgence of 
men's advantage is a sign of declining political influence. 
Party membership significantly decline. In urban area, more party members 
enter into private sector, but the effects of party membership are not significant. In 
rural area, the effects of party membership are still significant, but the parameters are 
declining. 
Political connection significantly increase in rural regions. In urban area, 
there are more private entrepreneurs with more political ties, but political 
connections are not significant. In rural China，impacts of political connection 
increase. This result is consistent with Guthrie's finding that social position 
influences the extent to which individuals perceive that they need to cultivate guanxi 
ties. Individuals embedded in powerful social networks may see no need to pull 
social strings (la guanxi) (Guthrie 2002b). 
So, the impacts of party membership decline but those of political connection 
increase. We find that past political background is not important any more，but the 
effects of current political connection remain in rural China. Neither political 
economy approach nor market transition thesis is correct. The effects of political 
capital turn out to be complex and need further analysis and explanation. Using 
models a and b，we have the following tables. 
<Table 9,10，11,12 here> 
The Tables show that factors like party membership, political connection have 
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positive effects on the scales of private enterprises, but not on productivity. In both 
urban and rural regions, education has significant and increasing impacts on 
productivity. 
Social investment significantly increase. Table 13 and Table 14 is the results 
of model a, replacing "P" with the amount of social investment. It shows that social 
capital investment has positive and significantly increasing impacts on productivity. 
The returns to social investment are greater in rural regions than in urban regions. 
�Table 13, 14, 15, 16 here> 
Test of Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1: supported 
Cultural capital, measured by formal education, is more and more important in 
post-socialist society. Evidence shows that there are increasing returns to cultural 
capital. We also find that cultural capital has higher returns in urban than in rural 
China. This finding supports Market Transition thesis. 
Hypothesis 2: supported 
When political connection is controlled, the returns to party membership are 
declining. Political capital is a very special kind of social capital. It is special because 
it is institutionalized in communist societies. One of the most important results of 
economic transformation is that political capital change into social capital. That's 
why the effects of party membership decline but those of political connections 
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increase. In Wank's research, he also find that the guanxi between government 
officials and entrepreneurs function at personal level. 
Hypothesis 3: supported 
According to Table 14’ when try the social investment analysis in the context of 
production function, it has significant impacts on productivity. But the causal 
connections may simultaneously go both directions. As stated in Chapter 4，the 
narrative stories suggest that political connections are more important for larger 
enterprises and therefore large enterprises invest more money in political 
connections. 
Hypothesis 4: not completely supported 
Although the private entrepreneurs in urban areas have more political 
connection and stronger political background, the impact of political connection in 
urban China is not significant, but it is significant in rural China, where fewer people 
have strong political background. And the credits of their political connection are less 
than urban regions. Although the parameters are not very large, it increases slightly 
from year to year. In urban China, people do have more opportunities to know 
officials in higher position, and they are more likely to be in a higher position in the 
old system themselves. 
Scholars in Economics and Management lay heavy emphasis on the importance 
of the creation of private property rights and the privatization of the economy. They 
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believe that uncertain environment is the main reason of the existence of guanxi or 
political connection. Guanxi is used to deal with uncertain environments. Now that 
the environments of Chinese private economy are more and more stable and certain, 
the impacts of political connection should decline. Urban China does have a stable 
environment in property right and other regulations than rural China. According to 
the environment dependent hypothesis, it is reasonable that political connection is 
more important in rural China than in urban China. But why in rural China, the 
impacts of political capital are actually increasing? We will not get the conclusion 
that the stability of private economy in rural China is even worse. This is because of 
the existence of principled clientelism in rural China, which will be discussed in 
hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 5: 
H5-1: supported. As discussed in part 1, the percentage of former administrative 
cadre and economic cadre is declining. More than 2/3 private entrepreneurs' first job 
is farmers, ordinary workers or unemployed. Even in urban regions, about 15-20% 
private entrepreneurs' first job is fanner. 
H5-2: Supported. The returns to former cadre are significant but declining 
from year to year. It even becomes insignificant in 2000. According to Political 
Capitalism theory, previously advantaged groups maintain their advantages by 
successful conversion of political capital into individual private wealth. They convert 
advantaged positions into new forms of post-communist privilege. They realize this 
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conversion either by entering the moneymaking business themselves or by providing 
certain benefits to certain entrepreneurs to exchange some money (so called 
"power-money" exchange). Consequently, there should be (1) more and more former 
cadre become private entrepreneurs and (2) People with more political connection 
are more likely to expand their business. The test and confirmation of both 
hypothesis 5-1 and 5-2 decline the Political Capitalism theory. 
Walder has similar findings. He discovers that the more direct the connection of 
a household to rural political office, the larger its earning power, whether from wages 
or from household enterprise. Entrepreneur households have past political ties have 
lower incomes than the entrepreneurs with no past or present political ties. 
Entrepreneur households containing former cadres earn 8 percent less, and 
households that have former kin earn 24 percent less, than households that do not 
have these past political ties. We can therefore rule out the possibility that past 
connections to political office elevate the incomes of these entrepreneur households. 
Hypothesis 6: supported 
Although urban private entrepreneurs have more political connections than their 
rural counterparts, political connection are more likely to have significant impacts in 
rural areas. We find that party membership and political connection have no 
significant impacts in urban areas, but in rural China, where principled clientelism 
exists, they are still effective to the success of private enterprises. 
Principled Clientelism Hypothesis: 
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There are both evidence support political economy theory and decline it. The 
whole data shows increasing returns to political connection. And in rural China, the 
influence of party membership maintained. But in urban China, the impacts of 
political connection and party membership are not significant. Even in rural China 
where presents evidence of maintenance of political power, the returns to party 
membership actually decline greatly. In 1993, being a party member has (exp.438)% 
higher assets than common people. In 2000，the advantage decline to (exp.l98)%. 
Correspondingly, market transition thesis is supported in regard to returns to 
party membership and the transformation of cadre position into new economic 
capital. It is also solidly supported by the fact that cultural capital is significantly 
important with firmly increasing impacts. 
My findings cast doubt on the validity of both the political economy theory and 
the market transition thesis. The features of China's reform are a reform from local 
society, but leaded by the government. However, every big progress comes from 
local level. China still has a Byzantine repressive political system. And the relation 
between this political system and its economic success is not clear. Thus the 
maintenance of political capital does exist, but it appears to be relatively small scale 
and conditionally effective. 
The social change process of China is both evolutionary and involutionary. 
However, different from Central Europe, there is differentiation in China. Political 
capital still have privilege, but the new economic elites have many privileges too. 
China is developing capitalists without capitalism. The maintenance of political 
105 
connection is accompanied by the changes of its content, which is now in the form of 
principled clientelism. In urban China, the evidence of the decline of political capital 
is obvious, but in rural China, it seems that the privileges of political capital maintain, 
sometimes even increase, especially when we come to political connection. 
Generally, the principled clientelism hypothesis is supported. It is a practical 
strategy to try to transform the devalued capital into new kinds of capital in the 
condition of structural change. Private entrepreneurs transform their economic 
capital into political capital; thereby achieve more economic accumulation through it. 
Only those who are good at capital transformation could succeed. To maintain and 
transfer their advantaged in communal system, social actors should have the right 
kinds of capital. In this context, the relationship between the old communal elites and 
the new elites who are out of the system experience dramatic change. A new alliance 
is formed. Both of them realize that unstable environments make against both reign 
and commercial activities. Therefore, cooperation is a win-win choice. Driven by 
local interests, some middle-level government officials take sides with local 
economic elites. On local level, economic elites and political elites establish close 
relationship. The new relationship, principled clientelism, characteristic of less 
personal and based on certain universalistic rules, is the results of rational choice of 
both sides. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This research tries to answer one core question: how private enterprises could 
mushroom when the formal property rights institution was in incubation and its 
enforcement was ineffective. Peng's research indicates that: in the early stage of 
market reform, informal network can protect property rights through individual trust 
and informal norms (Peng 2002). In recent years, with the development of market 
and private economy, there emerges institutionalized clientelist network between 
entrepreneurs of larger enterprises and local government officials to provide 
opportunities for both sides. 
This research demonstrates both the persistence of political capital and how it is 
changing in the midst of the rapid institutional transformations since the 1990s. A 
detailed look at political capital will shed light on one of the most dominant aspects 
of contemporary Chinese social structure. It also has large implications for the 
current debates. I believe that the distinctiveness of the Chinese private entrepreneurs 
and the quality of my data have much to contribute to theories of socialist transition 
in general, and to an understanding of the private economy development in China in 
particular. 
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THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF PRINCIPLED CLIENTELISM 
The most politically significant group, and the group that historically has 
contained the seeds of a civil society and has been a precursor to a more democratic 
system of rule, is the private entrepreneurs (Moore 1967). Theories of market 
transition predicted that these "producers" would wrest power from local officials. 
But as of now, this has yet to occur in China's countryside. This study investigates 
the constraints that local government applies to the private sector. It also shows that 
inducements are offered to private firms under principled clientelism. This paper 
analyzes the combination of different social forces through the development of 
private entrepreneurs and the impacts of entrepreneurship on changing social， 
political and economic arrangements in China. In the framework of "Market 
Transition Theory" and "Clientelism", this research indicates that in market transition 
process, there are two systems in charging of resources deploying. They are separate 
and both can provide opportunities and resources. Institutionalized principle 
clientelism stabilizes their interaction. This existing social structure is not a 
transitional feature. It will be preserved as a new way of deploying resources and 
pursuing social interest, an institutional structure arrangement that is maturating. 
The corporatist nature of this relationship offers an explanation of how 
communist cadres in China can promote the emergence of an economic elite that in 
other settings would be independent and therefore threatening. The common 
perception of "civil society" discourse, in which an emerging autonomous society is 
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attributed the potential for the ultimate overthrow of the communist state, will not 
happen at this moment. The activities sponsored by private enterprises are mostly 
related to government projects or proposed by governments. Few of them are 
Non-Government Organization (NGO) supporters. 
How communist officials are now using corporatist mechanisms to deal with a 
sector that the government does not own and therefore cannot control through 
manipulation of contracting arrangements or distribution of property rights (Oi 1999). 
Chinese private sector will not turn out to be what the classical theories predict. The 
existence of principled clientelism diminishes the chances that a growing private 
sector will emerge as an independent economic elite capable of usurping the power 
of local officials. On the contrary, the cooperation of local governments and 
influential private entrepreneurs results in a balance. 
However, the entrepreneurs of smaller enterprises create their own space. There 
do exist factors for further development of "civil society". In the early stage, market 
economy develops in a relatively independent field. With the gradual expansion of 
market, however, horizontal market connections set up new networks among 
individual entrepreneurs. Some entrepreneurs I interviewed told me that they prefer 
to establish relation with other entrepreneurs rather than officials. So, private 
entrepreneurs have alternative channels to develop and avoid one-side dependence 
on administrative system. In this sense, they can restrict officials' behavior. For 
example, if officials do not cooperate, they can breakup their connection unilaterally. 
We also find that both redistributive system and market system have changed. 
109 
Local governments rely less on central government and divert their role from control 
to service; private entrepreneurs begin to seek ally with officials due to the 
ever-increasing intensity of market competition. The principled clientelism I describe 
here as a media can advance and stabilize the interaction between these two systems. 
Although private entrepreneurs appeared as unexpected social forces out of the 
system in the very beginning, government administrative power is authoritative and 
legitimate. At first，private economy operates outside the command economy. With 
the growth of private economy, local governments include them into the channel of 
administration step by step. Admitting their legal position, officials penetrate into the 
operation process of private enterprises to exert the power of government. In 
different stages, governments have different methods to control private enterprises. 
REMAINING QUESTIONS 
In this research, I noticed the difference between ascribed political capital and 
acquired political capital. In the new situation, the influence of ascribed political 
capital has declined, but that of the acquired political capital has increased. Ascribed 
political capital means the political capital gained before entrepreneurs became 
private entrepreneurs, such as party membership, former cadre position or family 
background. Achieved political capital means the political connection they gain after 
they became private entrepreneurs, especially the political status they gain due to 
their achievements in private business. 
Market transition debate focus on whether political capital will lose its 
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advantages in China. The political capital they discuss is mainly ascribed political 
capital. My research indicates that although ascribed political capital has declined 
due to the development of market and institutionalization of environments, political 
capital maintain its influence in the form of achieved political capital. However, the 
existing data sets do not have information about how and when the entrepreneurs 
gain their political capital, we can not differentiate ascribed or achieved political 
capital. Further evidence is needed to answer the following questions: whether the 
differentiation of ascribed and achieved political capital really exists? What is the 
relation between owns of ascribed political capital and those of achieved political 
capital? What is the transformation mechanism between them? 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Local Government as Agent 
Function Sources Services 
Administrative Credits Loan, debit deferment 
constrains Administrative power Licensing; Entry permission 
(determent) 
Economic Information and Technology Provide information of policy 
inducements change and new technology 
Authority Credibility; Transregional and 
transnational connection 
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Table 2 Comparison of Different Clientelism 
FT J ~ 7 7 9 Symbiotic Principled 
Dependent Chentehsm clientelism Clientelism 
Private Private 
Two parts of the Private entrepreneurs entrepreneurs of 
, • . 1 entrepreneurs i . . 
relation vs. officials vs officials larger enterprises 
‘ vs. officials 
？ e g r e : � f Totally dependent ^odestly [ess dependent 
dependence � ^ dependent 
Power relationship Imbalanced Imbalanced Balanced 
Model Patron-client Patron-client Agent-client 
T .11 , , Compliance of Intangible resources Money; 5 . . ^ 
^ such as compliance; all protection and ^ “ ° ! 
What to present? material and career L e s s to profit 。 ^削如 f i^ es and 
, ^ ^ administrative advantages opportunities . ° convenience 
^ , Instrumental & Instrumental & 
Nature of relation Personal Personal Less personal 
9 I take the concept of Dependent clientelism from Walder (1986). But what Walder describes is the 
relationship between cadres and worker in communist work units. As discussed in Chapter2, in the first period 
(1978-1992), private entrepreneurs totally dependent on local officials due to the lack of legitimate status. 
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TABLE 3: Production Function, four years (dependent variable: LnSalesincome) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 1.051*** 3.704*** .743*** 1.164*** 
LnCapital .568*** .651*** .548*** .456*** 
LnLabor .348*** .386*** 533*** .591*** 
.688 .713 .621 .632 
N 1196 1569 1375 2511 
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Table 4: Occupational Origins of Private Entrepreneurs 
1993Valid Percent 1995 1997 2000 
PROFESS 11.0 11.8 7.5 14.8 
AD CADRE 6.0 6.6 5.6 2.7 
EN CADRE 7.6 6.9 5.6 5.5 
WORKER 26.5 22.8 18.6 24.6 
SOLDIER 5.3 4.2 4.5 4.2 
COMMERCE 7.3 6.4 4.1 4.7 
FARMER 15.6 16.5 39.2 28.9 
CRAFT 9.7 8.8 1.6 1.1 
SELF-EMP 6.8 11.1 6.6 5.6 
OTHER 4.3 4.8 6.6 8 
Total 100.0 
N 1421 2846 1926 2850 
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TABLE 5 First job: Occupation Distribution (cumulative percentage of worker, 
fanner, self-employed and unemployed) 
Valid percentage 1993 1995 1997 2000 
Whole 75.5 74.7 77.5 77 
Urban 67.8 64.5 62.1 68.8 
Rural 82.5 79.5 82.1 83.3 
N 1421 2846 1926 2850 
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Table 6: The Mean of Key Variables: 
1993 I 1995 I 1997 2000 
" a ^ Combined 41.895 —40.959 40.495 44.504" 
“ Urban “ 41.578 ~^0 .821 4 0 . 5 ^ 43.998— 
Rural “ 42.175 —41.034 40.402 44.891" 
Male Combined" .903 .895 .917 ^ 
Urban" .868 .854 — .890 .856 
Rural .934 .916 .931 .9lY 
Education Combined 10.708 —10.911 11.209 12.459 
UrbarT 11.562 12.144 12.674 13.665 
“ Rural 9.945 ~10 .314 1 0 . ^ 11.592 
College�/� 5.3" 5.1 5.4 — 11.8 
Party membership Combined .1330 .170 .181 .200 
Urban .109 .112 .144 .156 
R u r ^ .147 .199 .189 .236 
Year Combined 5.928 6.876 — 5.526 7 . 5 ^ 
Urban 5.344 6.463 5.886 7.559 
Rural" 6.469 ~ 7.066 5.431 7.446 
Political ties Combined 7.939 5.720 2.934 N A ^ 
Urban 8.554 6.762 — 3.502 
Rural 7.383 — 5 . 2 2 7 2 . 8 ^ 
Professional Combined .110 .118 .070 .139 
Urban .149 .177 . T ^ .205 
Rural .074 .091 .053 .090 
Economic cadre Combined .076 .069 .052 .051 
Urban .098 .088 .098 .054 
Rural .057 — .060 . o i T .048 
Administrative cadre Combined .060 .066 .052 .025 
Urban" .076 .090 — .073 .034 
Rural .044 — .055 .045" .019 _ 
"n ‘ Combined" 1421 2846 1926 2850 
UrbaiT 662 926 492 — 1195 
Rural 741 1913 1255 153^" 
Note: a. Age refers to the mean age in the sample. Education refers to the mean years 
of education in the sample. Year refers to average longevity of enterprises. All other 
entries refer to proportions in that category. 
b. 2000 has no information of political connection. 
1° Not Available. There is no information of political ties in year 2000's questionnaire. 
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Table 7 OLS Estimate of Key Variables 
(Urban Regions; Dependent Variable: Lnsalesincome) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant -4.897E-02 8.325*** -.286 1.558*** 
Male .808*** .504 .656* .554 
Age .153** .213** .162* 9.743E-02* 
Age^ -.001*** -.002*** -.001 -.01 
Education .159*** .213*** .216* .222*** 
Year .02 .091*** .041 .058*** 
Party .357 .374 .123 -.036 
membership 
Political .005 -.001 .004 N.A. 
connection 
N 593 377 391 1081 
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Table 8 OLS Estimate of Key Variables 
(Rural Regions; Dependent Variable: Lnsalesincome) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 1.829 9.368*** .175 .723 
Male .432 .892*** .200 .505*** 
Age .068 .103** .088** .070 
Age^ -.001 -.001*** -.001* -.001 
Education .091* .114*** .168*** .213*** 
Year .025 .040*** .052*** .058*** 
Party membership .374** .346*** .208* .193* 
Political .028** .030*** .046*** N.A. 
connection 
N 687 1252 1103 1424 
p<0.001 •**; p<0.01 **; p<0.05* 
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Table 9 OLS Estimates of Political Connection (Production Function Urban) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant .509 3.352 1.414 2.430** 
Capital .510*** .676*** .596*** .423*** 
Labor .415*** .275*** .462*** .501*** 
Male .313* -.104 -.035 .087 
Age .015 -.006 -.029 -.011 
Age2 -.000 -000 .000 .000 
Education .024** .063** .007** .009** 
Year -.027 .026 -.025 -.023* 
Party membership .171 .052 .015 -.104 
Former Cadre -.015 -.039 .030 -.234 
Political connection .003 -.014 .002 N.A. 
R2 .578 .737 .631 .594 
N 523 320 293 949 
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Table 10 OLS Estimates of Political Connection (Production Function Rural) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 1.121 2.383*** .061 .800 
Capital .584*** .639*** .552*** .404*** 
Labor .302*** .423*** .526*** .726*** 
Male .110 .143 .112 .166 
Age -.000 .054* .029 -.012 
Age2 -.001 -.001* -.000 .000 
Education .004** .049* .015 .061* 
Year -.013 -.013* -.019* -.019** 
Party membership .044 .189** -.158* -.028 
Former Cadre -.073 .005 -.135 .282* 
Political connection .007 -.006 .006 N.A. 
r2 .623 .709 .596 .674 
N 620 1173 953 1271 
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Table 11 OLS Estimates of Political Capital (Reduced Form Urban) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant .218 8.216*** -.390 1.705 
Male .832*** .536** .656* .555*** 
Age .140** .215** .172* .091 
Age2 -.002** -.003*** -.002* -.001 
Education .083*** 149*** .059 .134*** 
Year .025 .101*** .044 .058*** 
Party membership .352 .373 .180 -.027 
Former Cadre -.036 .260 .567* -.239 
Political 
Connection ^ ^ ^ 
R2 .289 .397 .262 .298 
N 563 338 358 981 
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Table 12 OLS Estimates of Political Capital (Reduced Form Rural) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 1.967 11.714*** 7.055E-02 .576 
Male .415 .688*** .363 .757*** 
Age .061 .026 .129*** .111* 
Age2 -.001 -.000 -.001*** -.001* 
Education .051* .087*** .092*** .123*** 
Year .026 .045*** .039** .025** 
Party membership .389* .215*** .153** .103*** 
Former Cadre -.171 .007 -.312 .733*** 
Political 030** .029*** .053*** N.A. 
Connection 
r2 .216 .204 .255 .287 
N 664 377 1056 1296 
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Table 13 OLS Estimates of Social Investment (Production Function Urban) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 1.289 3.519* 1.477 2.232* 
Capital .381*** .649*** .395*** .290*** 
Labor .307*** .229** .300** .320*** 
Male .238 -.111 -.025 .191 
Age .018 -.028 .018 .015 
Age2 -.000 .000 -.000 -.000 
Education .027 .069* -.010 .013 
Year -.019 .018 -.001 -.016 
Party membership .286 .156 .226 -.095 
Former Cadre -.105 -.155 .259 .016 
Social Investment .129** .017 .158*** .187*** 
r2 .579 .723 .737 .639 
N 369 373 342 383 
124 
Table 14 OLS Estimates of Social Investment (Production Function Rural) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 2.012* 2.082** 1.339 1.882 
Capital .515*** .653*** .506*** .247*** 
Labor .282*** .423*** .363*** .508*** 
Male .067 .203 .009 .137 
Age -.009 .045 .017 -.029 
Age^ -.000 -.001 -.000 .000 
Education .006 -.009 -.002 .035* 
Year -.033** -.017* -.038*** -.003 
Party membership .173 .123 .285 -.050 
Former Cadre -.078 .102 .035 .403* 
Social Investment .160*** .189*** .284*** .404*** 
R2 .665 .742 .628 .707 
N 409 747 512 487 
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Table 15 OLS Estimates of Social Investment (Reduced Form Urban) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 2.946* 6.425** 1.365 1.532 
Male .353* .302 -.257 .396* 
Age .041 .185 .128 .101 
Age2 -.001 -.002 -.001 -.001 
Education .045* .141** -.004 .043* 
Year .025 .100** .005 .007 
Party membership .443* .929* .334 .049 
Former Cadre -.096 -.073 .402 .134 
Social Investment .564*** .536*** .747*** .780*** 
R2 .356 .176 .642 .500 
N 392 382 374 392 
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Table 16 OLS Estimates of Social Investment (Reduced Form Rural) 
1993 1995 1997 2000 
Constant 2.875** 8.276*** 1.864 3.444** 
Male .219 .580* -.015* .253 
Age .064 .044 .094* -.029 
Age2 -.001 -.001 -.001 .000 
Education .040 .069** .037 .080*** 
Year -.023 .039** -.001 .017 
Party membership .300** .376** -.156 .137 
Former Cadre -.053 .063 .097 .615** 
Social Investment .550*** .448*** .748*** .695*** 
r 2 .374 .213 .402 .539 
N 437 766 551 498 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Private Entrepreneurs 
Name Age Education Gender Industry 
Zhao 35 College Male Electronic equipment 
Lin 36 College Male Clothing and neckties 
Yu 35 College Female Electronic equipment 
Qian 37 High school Male Clothing and neckties 
Li 42 Professional High School Female Electronic equipment 
Wong 53 Secondary School Male Machinery 
Shi 47 Secondary School Female Clothing and neckties 
Du 45 High School Male Electrical equipment 
Fan 44 Secondary School Male Clothing and neckties 
Yan 38 Secondary School Male Clothing and neckties 
Wu 55 Secondary School Male Clothing and neckties 
Zhang 62 Secondary School Male Clothing and neckties 
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Government officials 
Name Age Education Gender Bureaucracy 
Liu 42 College Male Food and Agriculture 
Song 42 Junior College Male Tax 
Zhou 36 College Female Industry and Commerce 
Li 37 College Male Industry and Commerce 
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APPENDIX 2: ABOUT THE FIELD SITE 
Details of the City" 
Shengzhou City, located in the east of Zhejiang Province, covers an area of 
1,784 square kilometres. It's only about 3 hours' drive from Shanghai, and about 1.5 
hours' drive from Hangzhou, Ningbo or Jinhua. It has the delightful climate with four 
seasons and plenty of rain in the year. 
Shengzhou is one of the first coastal cities and counties with an opening 
economic system. In 1994, the people achieved the Fairly Well-off aim ahead of time. 
And in 1997，the gross industrial and agricultural value of output reached more than 
100,000 million RMB yuan, and GDP reached 88,000 million RMB yuan. In 2001, 
GDP reached more than 100,000 million RMB yuan. As a growing medium modem 
city, Shengzhou has 8 main industries, such as silk knitting, clothing and neckties, 
machinery, electrical equipment, mineral products, building materials, bamboo 
weaving handicrafts and clay sculpture. The yearly necktie output reaches 200 
million, accounting for 80% of the yearly necktie output of China. And Shengzhou 
ranks first in Asia in the production and sale of electroacoustic devices. It is also rich 
in mineral resources, such as diatomite, granite, sand and medical stone. Especially, 
it has the largest reverses of diatomite in China. Shengzhou is also famous for its tea, 
fruits and silkworm cocoons. 
The famous Yue Opera artist Yuan Xuefen, the world champion of weiqi chess 
Ma Xiaochun and the famous economist and demographic theoretician Ma Yinchu 
‘ ‘Data resource: http://www.nyl 10.net/zsyz/indexe.php 
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were bom here in this city. Shengzhou City is famous as "Home of Yue Opera", 
"Home of Weiqi Chess"，"Home of Necktie", "Home of Bamboo Weaving", "Home 
of Electroacoustic Devices", "Home of Tea", and "Home of Lily Magnolia". 
Details of "Excellent Investment Environment" Movement^^ 
In order to promote foreign trade and economic and technical cooperation, 
the CPC Shengzhou Committee and Shengzhou People's Government formulated 
series of policy documents, such as CPC Shengzhou Committee Document 
No.2001-16, Shengzhou Government Document No.2001-93，No.2001-104 and 
No.2002-53. These documents include the following three main respects: 
Finance Supporting policies 
• Sharing the favourable policy ” Two Exempts and Three Half Deducts ” of 
the country, the new foreign-sino joint enterprises, foreign-sino cooperation 
enterprises and solely foreign-owned enterprises will share full allowance of 
the local left part of the income tax for the first three years, and in the next 
two years, 50% of for allowance. For the domestic investment enterprises 
from outside Shengzhou, they will also share the favorable policy as follows: 
Productive projects between 30 million and 50 million RMB yuan share one 
year's full allowance, and the second year 50%. Productive projects between 
50 million and 100 million RMB yuan share two years' full allowance, and 
then 50% for the next three years 
Data resource: http://www.ny 110.net/zsyz/tzzce.php 
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Favorable Policy For Land Use 
• Foreign actual investment of USD500, 000 or above for the productive 
projects can share the favorable policy for land use: 70,000 RMB yuan per 
mu. Foreign actual investment of 2 million US dollars or above can share: 
50,000 RMB yuan per mu. Foreign actual investment of 10 million US 
dollars or above can share: 30,000 RMB yuan per mu. Domestic actual 
investment from outside Shengzhou of 30 million RMB or above for 
productive projects can share: 70,000 RMB yuan per mu. Domestic actual 
investment from outside Shengzhou of 50 million RMB or above for 
productive projects can share: 50,000 RMB yuan per mu, and domestic actual 
investment from outside Shengzhou of 100 million RMB or above for 
productive projects can share more after further face-to-face talks. 
Polices For Agricultural And Sideline Products Intensive Process 
• Foreign investment projects for the agricultural and sideline products 
intensive process in the Economic Zone can share the land price 80,000 RMB 
yuan per mu and meanwhile they can share the favorable policy for land use 
for foreign investors. Besides, they can also share the favorable policies for 
production, daily life and services. 
Special Promises From The Bureau of Agriculture 
• To develop the agricultural industrialization is one of the futons of Shengzhou 
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Agriculture Bureau. So, Shengzhou Agriculture Bureau offers the following 
promises to all foreign investors for the agricultural investment projects: 
1. We will send specially assigned persons to help with all related procedures 
for all the investment projects received by us. 
2. We will help contact for the land for all the foreign investment projects in 
agriculture. 
3. For all the foreign investment projects in agriculture, we will first apply for 
national and provincial agricultural integrated development projects etc to 
gain supports from the country. 
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